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TAXATION OF ANNUITY CONTRACTS UNDER ESTATE
AND INHERITANCE TAXES
Robert Meisenholder *

A

GLANCE at any authoritative encyclopedia will confirm the
fact that annuity transactions of one sort or another have existed
since earliest civilized times. 1 It was not until r762, however, that the
first insurance company of the world was established; at that time began
the issuance of annuity contracts similar to our modem contracts.2 The
popularity of such contracts has increased and decreased ·at various
periods in Great Britain. 8 But in the United States, they have assumed
importance only since the beginning of this century and have attained
a relatively widespread popularity only since the years of prosperity
in the I 92o's.4
No doubt the minor role of annuities in the insurance business ex-
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2 ENCYCLOPEDIA. BRITANNICA, 14th ed., 1-5 (1937); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 1-3 (1938); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SocIAL SCIENCES 69-71 (1930).
2 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 1-2 (1938). For the history of annuity contracts
and other types of transactions called annuities, see I WALFORD, THE INSURANCE CYCLOPEDIA 97-171 (1871); Kopf, S'The Early History of the Annuity," 13 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SocIETY 225 (1927); MASSACHUSE"ITS INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT, THE "BIBLE OF LIFE INSURANCE" (1932); ZARTMAN, LIFE INSURANCE (1909) (Yale Readings in Insurance); ZARTMAN and PRICE, PERSONAL INSURANCE (1914) (2d ed. 1923) (Yale Readings in Insurance); O'DONNELL, HISTORY
OF LIFE INSURANCE (1936); CROBAUGH, ANNUITIES AND THEIR UsEs (1933);
MAGEE, LIFE INSURANCE (1939).
8 O'DONNELL, HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE (1936), contains an interesting
account of the ups and downs of English annuity schemes. A great increase in annuity
contracts issued in that country from 1912 to 1934 is shown by a table in an article
by Rowland and Wales, "The Taxation of the Annuity Fund and Some Practical
Points Arising Therefrom," 68 J. INsT. AcTUARIES 447 at 448 (1937).
4 In 1871 Walford could write the following: "In the United States annuities
are by no means a popular investment. In the year 1867, 44 of the principal insurance
offices only issued in the aggregate 19 annuities, involving an annuity charge of $9197;
and in the four previous years, although a greater number had been granted, they
were still sufficiently few to show that no interest is taken in this branch of business."
l WALFORD, THE INSURANCE CYCLOPEDIA 165 (1871). And in fact the first judicial
recognition of annuity contracts issued by insurance companies appears to be in the case
of Cahill v. Maryland Life Ins. Co., 90 Md. 333, 45 A. 180 (1900), which held a
contract not under seal valid and binding on both parties. As late as 1911 it was
said in a case concerning a deferred annuity contract, "The case is a novel one in the
sense that it involves a kind of insurance or indemnity which has not been in general
use, if in use at all." Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, (C. C. A. 1st, 1911) 184 F. 1
at 2, reversing Smith v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (C. C. Mass. 1910) 178 F. 510, and see
id., (C. C. Mass. 1907) 158 F. 365.
1
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plains the comparative paucity of cases concerning such contracts. In
recent years, however, with the increase of the annuity business a larger
body of case and statutory material has grown up. 5 The important part
played by tax law in this development is shown by the relatively large
number of cases dealing with annuity contracts in relation to taxation.
Of these cases a large number have arisen in connection with problems
under the estate and inheritance taxes.
To overcome objections of forfeiture and to meet the demand for
combined protection against loss of income in old age and against premature death, a variety of clauses providing for payments at the death
of the annuitant have been added to annuity contracts issued by insurance companies. It is in connection with these provisions that problems
arise under the estate and inheritance tax statutes.
That the possibilities of taxation upon the death of the annuitant
have not been fully realized until recently is shown by the fact that
annuity contracts have not been mentioned in many of the death tax
statutes and applicable regulations. Very few federal rulings have been
made concerning these contracts under the estate tax, and the first case
dealing with commercial annuities was decided in I 929. This lack of
interest can be explained in part no doubt by the comparative unimportance of the contracts in the insurance business until recent years.
Perhaps too there has been a feeling that a transfer of the kind usually
taxed under estate and inheritance taxes is not found in annuity transactions. And perhaps in so far as provisions for benefits payable at the
death of the annuitant are concerned, there has been a more or less tacit
assumption that the contracts are insurance contracts.
With the great increase in these contracts, however, the estate and
inheritance tax possibilities seem to have forced themselves upon the
taxing authorities, and important questions have arisen.

I
THE TAXATION OF ANNUITY CONTRACTS AS INSURANCE PROCEEDS

Of special importance is the question whether the proceeds payable
at death under a particular annuity contract are life insurance pro5 A review of the cases on annuities to the date of the article is found in Shannon,
"Judicial Interpretation of Annuity Contracts," 25 RECORD OF AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF ACTUARIES 485 (1936). Most of the cases in this field are found in the AMERICAN
LIFE CoNvENTioN LEGAL BULLETIN. For other general legal articles on annuity contracts issued by insurance companies, see Avery, "The Nature of an Annuity," 4 AssN.
LIFE INs. CouNSEL, PAPERS 65 (1928), as well as the articles in CoRPUs Jurus
SEcunuM and AMERICAN JuRISPRUD:ENCE.
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ceeds. 6 If such proceeds are considered life insurance proceeds, they
will be exempt from taxation at least to a limited extent under the
statutory provisions of some states and under the federal statute.1
They will also be included in the rule that the proceeds payable to a
named beneficiary are exempt from taxation where the particular
statute contains no specific provisions concerning insurance.8 Other
special questions concerning only insurance contracts will arise. 0 On
6 For a general treatment of this question in relation to the estate and income
taxes, see PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 3d ser., 369 et seq. (1940).
7 The following statutes expressly exempt from taxation insurance proceeds payable to named beneficiaries: Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1935), § 487c; Del. Rev. Code
(1935), § 135; 3 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 6-2401; 4 Ohio Gen. Code Ann.
(Page, 1938), § 5332-4; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1939), tit. 72, § 2301,
(d); Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931), § n5-1202.
Limited exemptions are provided for in the following statutes: Ala. Gen. Acts
(1935), p. 434; Ariz. Code (1939), § 40-105; Ark. Stat. (Pope, 1937), § 14001;
Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1937), act 8494, § 7; Fla. Comp. Laws (Perm. Supp.
1936), § 1342 (3) (G); 26 Ga. Code Ann. (193.7), § 92-3401; 3 Minn. Stat.
(Mason, Supp. 1940), § 2292 (5); Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1938), § 1678; Mont.
Rev. Code (1935), § 10400.1; 59 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1937), § 249r,
as amended by (Supp. 1940), § 249q; N. C. Pub. Laws (1939), p. 179; N. D. Laws
(1933), p. 375; Okla. Laws (1939), § 424; 20 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1939),
art. 7IIJ; Wis. Stat. (1939), § 72.01(7).
The federal statute has provided for a limited exemption since 1918. Revenue
Act of 1918, § 402 (f), 40 Stat. L. 1098 (1918). It includes insurance proceeds in
the gross estate "To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the
excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life." Internal Revenue Code,
§ 811 (g), 53 Stat. L. 122 (1939), 26 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 811 (g).
8 The inheritance or estate tax statutes of the following states contain no specific
provisions for the taxation of insurance proceeds: Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia.
By practice or ruling the above states do not tax insurance payable to named
beneficiaries. Tyler v. Treasurer, 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 300 (1917); Matter of
Parsons' Estate, II7 App. Div. 321, 102 N. Y. S. 168 (1907); Matter of Voorhees'
Estate, 200 App. Div. 259, 193 N. Y. S. 168 (1922), affirming 103 Misc. 515, 171
N. Y. S. 859 (1918). See cases collected in 47 A. L. R. 525 (1927); 63 A. L. R.
394 (1929); 92 A. L. R. 943 (1934); and 118 A. L. R. 324 (1939). A discussion
of this rule is found in 4 C. C. H., INHERITANCE, EsTATE AND G1FT TAX SERVICE
30,111-30,n3 (1940).
9 Thus under the federal estate tax, there is the question whether the section
dealing with insurance is exclusive or not. The section has been interpreted not to apply
retroactively in certain circumstances. For adequate discussions of these and other
special problems concerning insurance proceeds under the estate and inheritance taxes,
see Oppenheimer, "Proceeds of Life Insurance Policies under the Federal Estate Tax,"
-4-3 HARV. L. REV. 724 (1930); CLARK, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES ON LIFE
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the other hand, if the proceeds are not insurance proceeds, questions
of a different sort must be settled under the general clauses usually
found in the death tax statutes.
Confronted with a bewildering array of various types of annuity
contracts and combinations of insurance and annuity provisions, any
student would be hesitant in venturing general rules. Rather, for the
sake of clarity in respect to the problem an examination of each type
of contract seems required even at the risk of some repetition. Factors
to be considered in respect to the types examined will indicate the sort
of analysis helpful in connection with rare forms. 10
I.

Immediate Life and Temporary Life Ant11Uity Contracts

Where the contract is purchased by a single cash payment in advance and promises the payment annually, semi-annually, quarterly,
or monthly of a certain sum by the insurance company to the annuitant
for the duration of his life, the contract is an immediate single life
annuity. It may be purchased by the annuitant himself or for the
annuitant by a third party ( the owner or donor). The annuity is usually
for the period of the life of the annuitant but may be for the duration
of some third person's life. If the payments are to continue for a specified period only, or until the prior death of the annuitant, the contract
is a temporary life annuity. Since these contracts do not provide for
INSURANCE (1935); Fraenkel, "Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Policies," 5
BROOKLYN L. REV. 140 (1936); 32 ILL. L. REv. 223 (1936); 34 M1cH. L. REV.
1207 (1936); Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARv. L. REV.
1037 (1939); 40 CoL. L. REv. 86 (1940).
10
A variety of combinations of features, and a confusion of names in regard to
the various types of contracts issued make a rigid classification impossible and undesirable.
It seems feasible, however, to classify the contracts according to the primary types of
death benefit features involving estate and inheritance tax problems.
The "retirement annuity" contract illustrates the classification here. This
contract is issued on a deferred basis, the consideration to be paid in installments and
not by a single premium. During the period before maturity when the annuitant or
purchaser is paying the premiums, the company promises to pay the consideration paid
in or a surrender value to a beneficiary upon the death of the annuitant. But on
maturity, which can be accelerated, the annuitant or purchaser has the option of choosing
a life annuity, a refund annuity, an annuity certain, a joint and survivor annuity, etc.
These features are dealt with under the sections concerning life annuities, refund annuities, etc.
Again there is a combination contract which before maturity is similar to an
"insurance with annuity" contract, and after maturity to an "annuity with death
benefit'' contract. The features before maturity are treated in the section concerning
"insurance with annuity'' policies, and the features in force upon and after maturity
are dealt with in the section concerning "annuity with death benefit" contracts.
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payments of any kind to be made to others upon the death of the
annuitant ( with the exception of contracts for the period of a third
party's life 11) and are then terminated, there is no transfer at death
and thus no problem of estate and inheritance taxation.
2.

Deferred Annuity Contracts

Ordinary deferred annuities may be life annuities, temporary life
annuities, refund annuities, or joint and last survivor annuities. They
are to be distinguished from immediate annuities in that the annuity
payments do not begin until after a stated period of time from the purchase of the contract. The consideration can be paid either by a single
premium or installment premiums. Should the annuitant die during the
deferred period before the annuity payments are to begin ( the maturity
date), the contract is terminated and there is no refund. Upon the
death of the annuitant during the deferred period, therefore, there is
no problem of estate and inheritance taxation. Deferred annuities of
some types do contain a provision that the company will refund the
consideration or a surrender value to a named beneficiary in the event
of the death of the annuitant during the period of deferment, but this
feature will be discussed in connection with the so-called "retirement"
annuities. It is not usually incorporated in ordinary deferred life and
temporary life annuity contracts.

3. Refund Annuity Contracts and Annuities Certain
Refund annuity contracts guarantee a minimum return of the consideration paid. Should the annuitant die before the total amount of
payments made equals the premiums paid, the company promises to
continue the payments to a named beneficiary until their total amount
equals the consideration. As an alternative the beneficiary is usually
allowed the election of receiving the commuted value of the remaining
payments on a basis specified in the contract. Should the company
promise to pay in a lump sum the entire difference between the consideration paid and the total of the payments made to the annuitant
11 Contracts for the period of a life other than the annuitant's life are not common. In such contract if the annuitant dies before the end of the measuring life, payments may continue for the period of such life to a second annuitant. These payments
would not be insurance proceeds under death tax statutes unless annuity contracts which
pro,ide for some type of benefits to a second party at the death of the annuitant are
per se life insurance contracts for tax purposes. For the conclusion that such a view is
untenable, see page 871, infra.
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rather than continue the payments until such total equals the consideration, the contract is called a cash refund annuity. Somewhat similar
contracts, called annuities certain, provide for a guaranteed number
of payments irrespective of the death of the measuring life, to be continued to a beneficiary upon the premature death of the annuitant
before all of the guaranteed payments are received. These policies may
be of the immediate or the deferred type. And in any case of the above
types the sum which is guaranteed or in e:ffect guaranteed is never
greater than the consideration paid for the contract. Since there are
payments to a beneficiary at the death of the annuitant who purchases
the contract, questions concerning estate and inheritance taxes arise.
In Guaranty Trust Co. cv. Commissioner of Internal Recvenue,12 the
Board of Tax Appeals had before it refund annuity contracts in which
the insurance company promised to make quarterly payments to the
annuitant for life. If the annuitant died before the consideration paid
for the contracts was returned to him in the form of annuity payments,
the company was obligated to continue the payment to a named beneficiary until it had paid out the guaranteed amount. On the basis of
cases holding that annuity contracts, with or without death benefit
provisions, were not life insurance contracts, the board denied that the
proceeds paid to the beneficiary were insurance proceeds under the
Revenue Act of r9r8. Upon the same reasoning a lower New York
court in the case of Matter of Sothern's Estate 18 decided that the proceeds paid to a beneficiary under a typical refund annuity were not
insurance proceeds under the New York statute. In addition, it was said
that the refund provision was merely a provision for the return of consideration and involved no risk contingent upon the death of the
annuitant.
While the above cases are in line with the principal authorities,u
there appears to be a formidable argument that proceeds under a refund
contract should be considered insurance proceeds. It might be forcefully argued in the first place that all annuity contracts are insurance
contracts constituting insurance on life, and therefore proceeds paid
under refund contracts and other types of annuity contracts upon the
death of the annuitant should be considered insurance proceeds derived
from policies taken out on the life of the decedent.
12
16 B. T. A. 3 14 ( 1929), reversed by stipulation of counsel ( C. C. A. 2d, 193 1)
(no opinion), 3 C. C.H., FEDERAL TAX SERVICE, 1f 9090 (1931).
18
170 Misc. 805, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 509 (1938) affirmed 257 App. Div. 574,
14 N. Y. S. (2d) 1 (1939), noted 25 CoRN. L. Q. 629 (1940).
H See cases cited note 34, infra.
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"· .. the essence of insurance lies in the elimination of the uncertain risk of loss for the individual through the combination of
a large number of similarly exposed individuals who each contribute to a common fund premium payments sufficient to make
good the loss caused any one individual." 15
Or put more broadly, "Insurance may be· defined as a social device
whereby one person is enabled to make a contract with another, the
second party agreeing to assume certain definite risks of the first party
upon payment by the latter of a compensation called the premium." 16
Annuity contracts of the common types issued by insurance companies eliminate the risk of loss of income for the individual during his
lifetime through a combination of a large number of similarly exposed
individuals who make good the possible loss of such income by contributing to a common fund which assures all a certain, definite amount
of income for life. Thus a leading authority on insurance has said,
"Sight should not be lost of the fact that annuities are simply
another important means of insurance. For ever so long life insurance and annuities seem to have had a fence between them,
i.e., were regarded as vastly different from one another in an economic sense. Yet this is not at all the case fundamentally, although
it is true that life insurance may be regarded as creative in its purpose whereas annuities are designed to liquidate that which has
been created. In essense they are both 'insurance" in the true sense
of the term, although different in their application since 'creation'
constitutes the insurance in one case and 'liquidation' in the other.
Insurance is a pooling arrangement whereby the many make contributions so that the unfortunate few who die each year may receive a larger amount; whereas the annuity is also a pooling
arrangement whereby the fortunate, who do not live too long,
in the light of income, make a contribution so that the unfortunate,
who live too long (i.e., would outlive their otherwise limited
income), may receive a larger amount than they contributed.
So-called insurance protects against the absence of income in the
event of premature death, whereas the annuity protects (insures)
against the absence of income on the part of these a:fflicted with
undue longevity. Both mean dependable insurance to two unfortunate groups, the one dying too soon and the other living too
long. They are both insurance arrangements, the one pertaining to
15

8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE Soc1AL SCIENCES 95 (1932). Similar general definitions can be found in any textbook on insurance.
16
RIEGEL and LOMAN, INSURANCE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 19 (1928).
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the years of ascendency, and the other to the years of decline.
When coupled together, the two forms of insurance complete the
economic program from start to finish, on a basis of financial
dependability." 11
Concerning this view of insurance the Arkansas Supreme Court in
considering a premium tax on premiums collected by life insurance
companies said,
" ... expert witnesses called by the insurance companies differentiated annuity and other insurance, but the fact remains, in
our opinion, that it is insurance, and that money paid for annuity
insurance must be regarded as premiums paid for insurance.
"We are much persuaded in reaching this conclusion by the
extensive discussion of the subject by Professor Huebner . . .
in his textbook on Life Insurance. He devotes an entire chapter to
the subject of Annuities, and differentiates the various types of
annuities. We accept the view of Professor Huebner, rather than
that of judges, who, like ourselves, have only occasional contacts
with the subject. He says at page 154 of the chapter on Annuities
(3d ed.): 'Many believe that the growth of the annuity business
will be the outstanding feature in the life-insurance business during
the next quarter of a century.... The purpose of the annuity, it
is seen, is to protect against a hazard-the outliving of one's income--which is just the opposite of that confronting a person who
desires life insurance as protection against the loss of income
through premature death. Technically, however, the two types
of contracts are closely related to each other, since the cost of
both is computed on the basis of similar data and principles. Sight
should not be lost of the fact tqat annuities are simply another important means of insurance.'
''We conclude, therefore, that sums of money paid for annuity insurance which all the witnesses refer to as premiums, are
taxable under the statute hereinabove quoted." 18
11 HUEBNER, LIFE lNsuRANCE, 3d ed., 155-156 (1935). In REIGEL and LoMAN
1
INSURANCE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 65 (1928), it is said, "An annuity may be
defined as an insurance contract wherein the insurer, in consideration of a certain
premium, promises to pay a definite amount of income to the annuitant."
18
State ex rel. Holt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 198 Ark. 820 at 823-824, 131
S. W. (2d) 639 (1939).
Not only the literature of life insurance, but legal authority indicates that the
risk element spread over a group of persons is the essential feature of insurance plans,
and that annuity contracts are therefore insurance contracts. In Home Title Ins. Co.
v. United States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 107 at no, the court said, "The
business of insurance consists in accepting a number of risks, some of whjch will

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

It has been pointed out that whenever the liability of the company
is to some extent based upon survival there are many points of similarity between insurance contracts and annuity contracts.19 In the first
place the general method of computing premiums is the same as in
other types of insurance. The consideration is composed of two elements
-loading, and the net premium. The probability insured against ( the
probability of survival) based upon accepted mortality tables, the
amount of risk, and the discount element are the factors considered in
computing an annuity premium. The same elements are used in calculating a life insurance premium, except for the fact that the probability of death instead of the probability of survival is pertinent. A
di:fferent mortality table is used in the case of annuities because annuitants as a class are longer lived than the tables used for calculating
life insurance would indicate.
The risk is not under the control of the insurer or the insured to
any greater extent than in life insurance. Legal reserves are required
to the same extent as in other forms of insurance. The original source
of the annuity payments by the insurance company is the same-the
payment of premiums by policy holders. There is no indemnity element, but neither is there in life insurance. There is payment on a contingency (survivorship) just as there is in life insurance (death). Annuity contracts are issued by insurance companies and through their
regular agents on a commission basis. Furthermore, in the life insurance
business annuity contracts have often been called policies, and the considerations paid have been called premiums.
Technically it would appear therefore that a strong case can be
made showing that annuity contracts involving life contingencies are
insurance contracts. Nevertheless a large body of respectable authority
holds to the contrary.20 The reasoning of these cases seems to be that
involve losses, and of spreading such losses over all the risks so as to enable the insurer
to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability upon it."In several cases,
although other issues were involved, the court spoke of annuity contracts issued by
insurance companies as insurance contracts. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, (C. C. A.
1st, 19u) 184 F. 1, reversing (C. C. Mass. 1910) 178 F. 510; Shields v. Barton,
(C. C. A. 7th, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 351.
19
Brief of Respondent, State ex rel. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lucas, (pending in the
Missouri Supreme Court).
20
The various decisions are made in respect to particular statutes and the interpretation of annuity contracts is thus closely linked with particular statutory problems.
In the majority of cases concerning taxes on premiums collected by life insurance
companies, the distinction between annuity contracts and other insurance policies has
been at least partially relied upon in reaching the conclusion that the particular tax
is limited to life insurance premiums under ordinary types of life insurance. Com-
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an annuity contract has not been defined historically in relation to any
risk involved in payment but rather in terms of the manner of the payments. From this legal definition of an annuity, the cases have gone
on to point out that annuity contracts contain no element of indemnity,
an essential of insurance except in the case of life insurance. Then they
have pointed out that annuity contracts are not life insurance contracts
because life insurance contracts involve the contingency of death and are
the exact opposite of annuity contracts. This approach has been a definitional approach which has disregarded the mechanical and actuarial
aspect of annuity contracts issued by insurance companies. It would
appear that merely because annuity contracts traditionally do not involve insurance, it does not follow that annuity contracts issued by
insurance companies are not technically insurance contracts.21
In addition it might be urged that refund contracts and other annuity contracts with death benefit provisions should be considered insurance contracts and the death benefits be considered insurance proceeds because the public policy consideration that provisions for dependents should not be discouraged by inheritance taxation includes
monwealth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 Pa. 510, 98 A. 1072 (1916); People
ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 193 App. Div. 413, 184 N. Y. S. 345
(1920), affirmed 231 N. Y. 630, 132 N. E. 916 (1921); Daniel v. Life Ins. Co. of
Virginia, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 102 S. W. (2d) 256; State v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 68 N. D. 641, 282 N. W. 4II (1938); State ex rel. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Ham, 54 Wyo. 148, 88 P. (2d) 484 (1939). In cases where it was
contended that annuity contracts were void because the contract forms had not been
filed, it has been said that the statutes requiring filing of insurance policy forms do not
apply because annuity contracts are not policies of insurance. Hall v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 146 Ore. 32, 28 P. (2d) 875 (1934); Rishel v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 881. Where a statute forbade the issuance of
policies by mutual life insurance companies except upon the mutual plan, it was held
that mutual companies could issue annuity contracts without participation. Carroll v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, (D. C. Mo. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 223. Under a statute
providing that payments under policies of life assurance of any description are not to be
apportionable, annuity policy payments are held not to be included. Cuthbert v. North
American Life Assurance Co., 24 Ont. Rep. 5II (1894). See also Coyne v. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App. (2d) 104, 47 P. (2d) 1079 (1935); People v.
Security Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 78 N. Y. 114 (1879). See also In re Power, (C. C.
A. 7th, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 69.
A similar conclusion has been reached in relation to a pure endowment contract.
Curtis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 217 Mass. 47, 104 N. E. 553 (1914).
21
While it may be somewhat justifiable to criticize the body of authority built
up on the basis of two or three leading cases holding that annuity contracts issued
by insurance companies are not insurance contracts, it is not intended here to criticize
the specific results reached in the cases. Even if the cases in this one aspect are to be
disregarded, they could be explained by policy considerations under the particular
statutes involved.
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provisions for old age. Apparently· the concept of annuity contracts as
insurance policies is incorporated in the Tennessee statute which provides that the insurance section shall
"include the proceeds of insurance policies commonly known as
'paid-up' contracts or 'investment contracts' or 'annuity contracts'
or similar types or forms of policies, the surrender value of which
was subject to the control of the decedent prior to death." 22
Whatever arguments can be made in the above direction, the inheritance taxation cases have adopted the distinction drawn between
annuity contracts and insurance policies for other purposes and have
approved the conclusion that annuity contracts are not insurance policies. This result has been reached as a matter of statutory construction
where the statute treated insurance proceeds specifically,28 as well as
where there was no mention of insurance proceeds.~4 This conclusion,
although perhaps doubtful on a technical basis, is fortified by the fact
that the decisions regarding insurance and the statutory exemptions
under the estate and inheritance taxes were directed toward life insurance, and ordinary annuities for life are not life insurance contracts,
although they may be insurance contracts. 25 Annuity contracts could be
22
Tenn. Code (Michie, 1938), § 1261a. Some additional support for the argument that insurance includes annuity policies in a general way, irrespective of death
benefit payments, might be gained from the cases which have held that annuity premiums are taxable under particular premium tax statutes. Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 223 Iowa 333, 271 N. W. 899 (1937); Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 227 Mass. 63, II6 N. E. 469 (1917); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 89 N. H. 21, 192 A. 297 (1937). However, the results reached
in these cases were primarily upon the basis of the specific statutes involved. State ex rel.
Holt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 198· Ark. 820, 131 S. W. (2d) 639 (1939), and
State ex rel. Gully v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, (Miss. 1940) 196 So. 796,
appear to be the strongest cases in this direction.
Another case that appears pertinent to this particular inquiry is Bates v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 206 Minn. 482, 288 N. W. 834 (1939), where it was
held that annuity contracts were included in the phrase under the blue sky law, "policy
contracts of insurance companies licensed to do business in this state." Such contracts
were excepted from the application of the statute.
23
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 16 B. T. A. 314
( I 929), reversed by stipulation of counsel ( C. C. A. 2d, 193 I) ( no opinion) ; Matter
of Sothern's Estate, 170 Misc. 805, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 509 (1938), affirmed 257
App. Div. 574, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 1 (1939).
24
State ex rel. Thornton v. Probate Court, 186 Minn. 351, 243 N. W. 389
(1932). This case, however, does not concern an ordinary type of annuity policy. See
page 878 ff., infra.
.
25
Although life insurance policies and annuity contracts have the elements already
pointed out as common to both insurance policies and annuity contracts, the differences
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called insurance "upon life," but not "life insurance." Death benefit
payments in connection with the contracts would therefore be payments
in connection with "insurance on life" but not necessarily "life insurance" payments. And the protection of dependents by exemptions accorded to life insurance policies is quite a different matter in relation
to the considerations of policy involved than protection against loss of
income and security in old age.26
Yet it must not be concluded that death benefits in connection with
annuity policies, such as the refund proceeds under a refund annuity
contract, are not life insurance proceeds merely because annuity policies
are not in general to be called insurance policies or life insurance policies, on account of their technical nature and as a matter of construction
of the statutory exemption under the estate and inheritance tax statutes.
In this respect the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in the Guaranty Trust Company 21 case can be criticized. The inquiry must be carare also pronounced. Life insurance operates to create an estate and to protect dependents against the premature death of the insured, whereas ordinary annuity contracts aim to liquidate an estate and protect the annuitant against outliving his estate.
As ordinarily understood, life insurance means death protection as distinguished from
the investment protection afforded by ordinary annuity contracts. HUEBNER, LIFE
INSURANCE, 3d ed., 154 (1935); MAGEE, LIFE INSURANCE 188, 463 (1939);
HUEBNER, THE ECONOMICS OF LIFE INSURANCE 106 (1937).
The cases cited in notes 20 and 34 make the same distinction. The nearly universal legal definition of life insurance is that it involves the payment to a specified
sum upon the death of the insured. Helvering v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 299 U. S. 88,
57 S. Ct. 63 (1936), rehearing denied, 299 U.S. 622, 57 S. Ct. 63 (1936); Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Life Ins. Co., 294 U. S. 686, 55 S. Ct. 572 (1935). Since the
simpler forms of annuities involve no such payments at death, annuity contracts per se
are not life insurance contracts. See Cohen, "Annuities and Transfer Taxes," 7 KAN.
B. A. J. 139 (1938).
There might be some question raised concerning the statement that the insurance
provisions of the statutes are directed at life insurance contracts exclusively, since the
language of some of the statutes does not specifically include the term "life insurance."
ApP.arently, however, the point is so clear that it has been assumed. The federal regulations read, "The term 'insurance' refers to life insurance of every description, including death benefits paid by fraternal beneficial societies, operating under the lodge
system." Treas. Reg. So, art. 25 (1937).
26
One further type of argument has been made in connection with annuity contracts and has been recognized in one case. Upon the general basis of the fact that such
contracts are supervised by state officers who have charge of insurance matters and that
such contracts must conform by state law to many of the requisites laid down for life
insurance and other contracts, it has been claimed that they are insurance contracts and
come within the estate and inheritance tax laws as life insurance contracts. In the case
of In re Fi~immon'sEstate, 158 Misc. 789,287 N. Y. S. 171 (1936), affirmed 248
App. Div. 862, 291 N. Y. S. 168 (1936), it was said that the payment of moneys in
connection with a retirement system was insurance for a somewhat similar reason.
27
16 B. T. A. 314 (1929), discussed supra, note 12.
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ried farther, and the nature and effect of the death benefit provisions
must be examined.
The conclusion reached in the Sothern 28 case was that the refund
provision was merely a provision for the return of consideration paid
involving no risk to the insurance company and therefore the contract
could not be said to provide for insurance proceeds. But again there is
room for some doubt.
Technically the refund provision could very easily be viewed as an
insurance feature. It might be thought of as a species of decreasing
term insurance, a form of life insurance. This contention was pressed
in the Guaranty Trust Company case.29 The premiums on any particular
immediate or deferred life annuity contract for a certain annual payment will be a specified amount. In order to enable the company to
include a refund provision in a contract to make the same payment
annually, a larger premium must be collected.30 Thus a method of
computing premiums in connection with refund annuity contracts is to
calculate the amount of premiums necessary for an ordinary single life
annuity, and then to calculate on the basis of life insurance mortality
tables the cost of decreasing term insurance, for the length of time
the refund provision is in e:ffect.81 The first year the decreasing term
insurance will be the entire amount of the consideration, the second
year the reduced amount of the refund, and so on, until no refund is
to be made. The refund provision can be looked at as a superimposed
life insurance arrangement upon an annuity. There is also some authority for treating these death benefit provisions as separable from the
annuity provisions.82
Furthermore, from the viewpoint of the purchaser the refund
feature may have the superficial appearance of insurance if it is considered by him as a device for the protection of dependents in the case
of premature death. With this idea in mind one writer has said,
"It is the author's feeling that . . . benefits ••• under the
various types of contracts herein discussed are designed ostensibly
for the support of dependents and those entitled to the decedent's
28

170 Misc. 805, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 509 (1938), a:ffd. 257 App. Div. 574, 14
N. Y. S. (2d) 1 (1939), discussed supra, note 13.
29
16 B. T. A. 314 (1929).
so HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE, 3d ed., 158 (1935).
81
MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE, 2d ed., 62 (1929).
82
Bowman v. Tax Commission, 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916 (1939),
affirming 61 Ohio App. 163, 22 N. E. (2d) 524 (1938) (court held on an actuarial
basis that an annuity with death benefit contract was divisible).
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remembrance, and like life insurance payable to named beneficiaries should be entitled to the insurance exemptions under state
and federal statutes. The lifetime payments to decedents represent the investment character of the contracts, not the benefits
passing to designated beneficiaries." 88

In spite of the above arguments, it would appear that there is no
real life insurance transaction upon the purchase of a refund annuity.
Although the contract may be viewed as a combination of an annuity
and decreasing term insurance, it is after all one contract and must be
looked upon as a whole. 84 Life insurance involves more than payment
of a benefit at death. It is distinguished by a pooling of risks of premature death. The insurance company takes the risk that any particular
policyholder will expire before the mortality tables would indicate and
will receive more than he had paidintothecompanyplusinterest earned
on premiums already paid.85 But in refund annuities no such risk is
3

s CLARK, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES ON LIFE INSURANCE 184 (1935).
' Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 16 B. T. A. 314
(1929), dismissed by stipulation of counsel, (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) (no opinion); Matter
of Sothern's Estate, 170 Misc. 805, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 509 (1938), affirmed by 257
App. Div. 574, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) I (1939); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. ISt, 1939) l02 F. (2d) 380, affirming 37 B. T. A.
435 (1938}; Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 37
B. T. A. 535 (1938), appeal dismissed (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 3 C. C.H., FEDERAL TAX
SERVICE, 1f 3423.23 (1940); Schultz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 38 B.
T. A. 59 (1938); Ballou v. Fisher, 154 Ore. 548, 61 P. (2d) 423 (1936); State ex
rel. Thornton v. Probate Court, 186 Minn. 351, 243 N. W. 389 (1932). Where two
contracts have been issued together they have been considered one. Helvering v. Tyler,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940) III F. (2d) 422, affirmed per stipulation of counsel to abide by
the Supreme Court decisions in the Le Gierse and Keller cases; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller's Estate, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 833, affirmed
Keller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 651; Helvering v.
Le Gierse, (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 646, reversing Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Le Gierse, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) I 10 F. (2d} 734, affirming 39 B. T. A. 1134
(1939).
35
An explanation of the risk born by the company or the insured group is found
in HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE, 3d ed., 199-219 (1935). All insurance textbooks
contain •similar explanations.
That the company's taking of a risk contingent upon death upon the issuance
of a policy of life insurance is an essential element of the contract has been recognized
in many cases. Cases cited supra, note 34.
Definitions of life insurance ignoring the risk element are commonly found,
but each particular definition is modified by the purpose for which it was made. An
often-quoted definition that includes the risk element is found in Ritter v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139 at 151-152, 18 S. Ct. 300 (1898): "Life insurance
imports a mutual agreement, whereby the insurer, in consideration of the payment
by the assured of a named sum annually or at certain times, stipulates to pay a larger
3
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taken by the company when it incurs the obligation to refund the consideration. The beneficiary receives just what the purchaser of the
contract paid in. In order to make the refund payment no pooling arrangement is necessary. Nothing is received from a fund made up of
contributions by those who have risks like the purchaser of the contract,
but rather the amounts paid in are simply returned. Therefore a vital
element common to life insurance policies is lacking. The refund
feature might be compared to a deposit of money by the annuitant to be
paid to a third party upon condition, or the deposit of a deed in escrow
upon certain conditions. This analysis is supported by the fact that no
physical examinations are necessary upon the issuance of refund contracts. The company will take no risk if the annuitant dies during the
period when the refund provision is in force.
It does seem to be true that the contract involves an annuity risk
in that the company must continue payments for life. This risk as it
affects the contract has already been considered. It does not mean that
the company will take a risk upon death in connection with the refund
feature when that feature is considered with the contract as a whole.80
sum at the death of the assured. The company takes into consideration, among other
things, the age and health of the parents and relatives of the applicant for insurance,
together with his own age, course of life, habits and present physical condition; and
the premium exacted from the assured is determined by the.probable duration of his
life, calculated upon the basis of past experience in the business of insurance."
Another definition indicating the risk element is the following: "A contract of
life insurance is a mutual agreement by which one party agrees to pay a given sum
upon the happening of a. particular event contingent upon the duration of human life,
in consideration of the payment of a smaller sum immediately, or in periodical payments by the other party." 37 C. J. 359 (1925). See Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U. S.
1941) 61 S. Ct. 646; Keller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U. S. 1941) 61
S. Ct. 651.
36
Thus in addition to the method suggested of considering the refund as a decreasing term insurance, the premium could be calculated by taking not the probability of
the number dying in the years of the refund but the certainty that the payments must
be made for that number of years. Then for the period following the refund period, the
probabilities of survival would be used. Thus the ordinary basic method of calculation
of annuities would be to take the amount of payment desired annually times the
probability of survival on the basis of mortality tables times a dollar discounted for the
number of years till the payment is to be made. In a refund annuity under which
payments are to be guaranteed for five years, certainty of one would be substituted for
the probability figures. HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE, 3d ed., 250-251 (1935).
Another method of looking at the refund contract is to consider it a combination,
the first part being an annuity certain for the guaranteed period with the first payment
due at the beginning of the year and the second part being a deferred life annuity
under which the payments begin at the end of the guaranteed period. The premiums
on each part could be calculated and then added together.
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The choice of the life insurance risk element as the test in these
cases also appears justifiable. No other basis of distinction can be made
basically between life insurance policies and ordinary beneficiary contracts. Formal distinctions between annuity and life insurance contracts
would form a shifting foundation for decision. To call any contract
with death benefits issued by an insurance company an insurance policy
would be too sweeping and indiscriminate. 87 The result would be an
invitation to evade inheritance and estate taxes.
Insurance in the legal field and in nonlegal literature is conceived
to be a matter of risk-shifting to such an extent that by "amounts received as insurance" the legislators must have meant amounts received
under a contract in which the insurance company took an insurance
risk, and more specifically a life insurance risk. If the ordinary types
of life insurance were meant, it would appear that the legislative policy
was to exempt provision by taxpayers for their dependents by insurance
means only, for many other types of provisions for dependents are specifically within the tax. And while it might be that particular purchasers
take out refund annuities to protect dependents, the protection is not
by a life insurance transaction. Furthermore, the primary purpose of
the contracts must by their very nature be protection against loss of
income, the refund feature being more in the nature of an incidental
protection against forfeiture. This conclusion is fortified by the express
statutory treatment of annuity contracts in three states.88
37 Many elements or factors that could be mentioned seem immaterial in drawing
any distinction between annuity proceeds and ordinary insurance proceeds. Since both
annuities contingent upon life and life insurance are issued on the basis of mortality,
the company's interest in age is not significant. The name of the contract would appear
to be immaterial. The name given a contract by the company often depends on considerations of salability. Such features as the power to change the beneficiary, a cash and
loan value, participation in dividends, options to select various types of benefits, and
options to accelerate maturity are not in themselves basic factors because they are found
in nearly all types of policies. Even the absence of the requirement of a medical examination is not a certain test because some life insurance policies are issued without such
examination. If an examination is required, however, it would appear that the company
is interested in the risk of early death rather than the risk of living a long span of
years. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 646, and Keller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 651.
38
In the section providing for a specific exemption of certain insurance proceeds
the Colorado statute reads, "provided further, that annuity contracts not based on or
resulting from life insurance contracts or proceeds shall not be entitled to the exemption herein provided." 3 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1934), c. 85, § 9. In regard to the
exemption concerning insurance, the Oregon statute provides, "but such exemptions
shall not include any investment policy issued by a life insurance company which does
not include in the policy the element of life insurance." Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1940),
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4. "Retiremenf' Annuity Contracts
Various types of deferred annuities are being issued under such
names as "retirement annuity," "pension bond," "special income annuity," "optional deferred annuity," and "income continuation policy."
The contracts do not have exactly the same features but ordinarily they
do in common provide for monthly or other periodic income if the annuitant survives the deferred period. Often the annuitant or the purchaser can elect to receive a life annuity, a refund annuity, an annuity
certain, or even a joint and survivor annuity at the end of the deferred
period. Before the maturity of the contract, during the deferred period,
provision is made for cash values and for death benefits. The latter
are slightly higher than the cash values during the first part of the
deferred period because of a surrender charge, but ordinarily in the
latter part of the deferred period the death benefits and the cash values
are the same. Both are then usually equal to the amount paid in premiums. Sometimes the contracts are participating and they usually contain
a privilege to accelerate the maturity.
The treatment of the amount received on maturity depends upon
the type of annuity elected, and the usual types are treated in prior
and following subsections. The insurance problem is also raised, however, in connection with the death benefits during the deferred period
when made payable to a named beneficiary.
Here a technical argument, somewhat similar to that suggested in
§ 20-101. Under these statutes, however, the question remains whether any particular
policy is a life insurance policy.
The Kentucky statute states, "In the event it shall appear, either from the will
of the decedent or from extrinsic evidence that an obligation of a contractual nature
exists in favor of any person, payable at or after death of the decedent, said sum so
payable shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as a taxable transfer, unless it
shall affirmatively appear by competent evidence that a consideration substantially equivalent in value to the amount so due under said contract was paid or furnished by or for
the other party thereto during the life of the decedent." Ky. Acts (Spec. Sess. 1936),
pp. 105-106. This statute is aimed at tranactions in which the decedent, instead of
leaving a beneficiary a direct legacy, sets out in his will or in another instrument that
he is indebted to the beneficiary for services or for some other reason and the sum is to be
paid out of his estate at his death. The language indicates this purpose when it speaks
of taxing the transfer between the parties to the contract unless the other party furnishes the decedent a substantially equivalent consideration. Ordinarily the beneficiary
under a refund provision of a refund annuity contract or under other death benefit
provisions is a beneficiary and not a party to the contract in the ordinary sense of the
word. 2 W1LLISTON, CoNTRAcTs, rev. ed., § 356 (1936); I CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,
§§ 12 (comment b), 15, 133 (1932). Therefore while the language might be interpreted to include annuity contracts, it seems doubtful whether that result would be
reached. See, however, TAXATION AFFECTING LIFE INSURANCE 139 (1938).
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connection with refund annuity contracts, can be made to the effect that
the death benefit proceeds are life insurance proceeds. Again it can be
said that a deferred annuity of a certain amount costs less than a deferred annuity of the same amount with a death benefit provision,
under which the premiums paid in will be paid to a named beneficiary
on death during the deferred period. This is necessarily true since
in the case of a deferred annuity without a death benefit the company
can balance the losses incurred because some annuitants live too long
against the gains realized because some annuitants have forfeited the
amounts paid in by reason of their death during the deferred period.
The company, if it incorporates a death benefit provision in the contract,
must therefore collect an additional amount to be able to pay out the
consideration paid in and to pay those annuitants who die late in life.
This additional amount paid in by virtue of a death benefit provision
of the type here being examined can be conceived of as a premium for
increasing term insurance, which is the amount of the consideration or
death benefit.39
If the contract could be considered divisible, the above type of
argument would have validity, but there seems no warrant for separating it into two parts:4° From the viewpoint of either the company or
the purchaser, the company takes no life insurance risk in so far as the
payment of death benefits is concerned.41 There is no life contingency
89
HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE, 3d ed., 159 (1935) states: "Under a pure deferred annuity, there is no refund of the premiums that may have been paid in case
the annuitant should die before the first instalment of the deferred annuity becomes
payable. Frequently, however, deferred annuities are made to provide for a return to
the annuitant's executors, administrators, or assigns of all premiums in the event
of his death before the annuity payments begin. This would represent a combination of
insurance with the annuity."
In MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE, 2d ed., 62 (1929), the author states, "In the
simplest form of deferred annuity, nothing whatever is payable by the company if the
annuitant should die before the first payment of the annuity is due. This fact, of
course, enters into the calculation of the premium, and the possibility of 'forfeiture'
by death is compensated by a correspondingly low rate of premium, the premiums
being just sufficient to provide the annuity payments to those who survive. There is,
thus, no real forfeiture since the purchaser receives exactly what he pays for, but the
popular distaste even for an apparent forfeiture renders such simple deferred annuities
unattractive to most purchasers. This has resulted in a form of deferred annuity under
which a return of part or all of the premiums paid, or even all the premiums with some
interest added, is made in event of the death of the annuitant before the annuity has
been entered upon. • .. These features are simply life insurance superimposed on the
annuity. During the period of deferment the insurance increases, while after the annuity has commenced, it decreases." See also MAGEE, LIFE INSURANCE 478 (1939).
40
See cases cited in note 34, supra.
41
See note 3 5, supra.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

involved in making the payments upon the death before maturity.
Speaking of cash surrender values and death benefits under this type of
contract, one writer says,
"The contract thus affords the insured a means of accumulating a
fund in a manner similar to that underlying a savings account arrangement. No life contingency is involved and the size of the
savings account depends, not upon the age of the annuitant when
the policy is issued, but mainly upon the size and duration of the
deposits. The age of the policyholder at the end of the deferred
period, however, is an important factor in determining the size of
the annuity which the savings fund will purchase." 42
No case involving estate and inheritance taxes has settled the status
of this feature in relation to insurance company contracts, but the cases
dealing with refund annuities are applicable.4 3 A similar type of payment to a beneficiary under a municipal pension plan was held not to
be taxable as insurance under section 302(g) 44 of the federal estate tax
in Kernochan v. United States. 45 In that case a member of the New
York City employee's retirement system died before retirement, and
under the statute and his application agreement his widow was paid a
return of amounts deducted monthly from his salary plus interest at
four per cent. In addition she was paid the amount of a year's salary.
It was conceded that the amount equal to a year's salary was insurance,
but the sum of the deductions from salary plus interest was held taxable
under section 302 (c) of the federal estate tax and not taxable under
section 302 (g). A similar result was reached by the Board of Tax
42
HUEBNER, LIFE lNsuRANCE, 3d ed., 194 (1935). See also HUEBNER and MoCAHAN, LIFE INSURANCE AS INVESTMENT 24, 28 (1933).
48 Section 3, supra.
44
Sec. 8II(g) of the present Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. L. 122 (1939),
26 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 811 (g).
45
(Ct. CI. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 860, cert. den., 309 U. S. 675, 60 S. Ct. 711

(1940).
Similar amounts payable under the New York City civil service retirement system
were, however, assumed to be insurance proceeds in In re O'Donnell's Estate, I 53
Misc. 480,275 N. Y. S. 445 (1934). In. the case of In re Fitzsimmon's Estate, 158
Misc. 789, 287 N. Y. S. 171 (1936), affd. 248 App. Div. 862, 291 N. Y. S. 168
(1936), it was held that moneys payable to a beneficiary from the Teacher's Retirement
System of New York City were to be classified as insurance for the purpose of the
New York Estate Tax Law. Part of these moneys constituted a return of amounts
deducted from the salary of the decedent. The decision in its application to these
amounts was not followed in the Kernochan case and can be justly criticized since it
was made on the general basis that actuarial principles were used in operating the
retirement system, and the system was under the supervision of the insurance department of the state. See note 23, supra.
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Appeals.4 6 These cases are consistent with the case of In re Walsh,4' 1
in which it was held that a retirement annuity contract was not "insurance ... effected in favor of another" under an exemption statute.48
They are also supported by the ruling that an endowment policy is not
an insurance policy under exemption statutes although it provides for
the return of a consideration to a named beneficiary in case of the death
of the purchaser during the endowment period. 49
The same conclusion that was reached in regard to refund annuity
policies is thus indicated. 50 The analysis of the contract here as a deferred annuity with increasing term insurance for the purposes of the
estate and inheritance taxes would be arbitrary and artificial. Rather
than reach any conclusion by refined actuarial analysis, the substantial
and essential character of the contract should be considered. 51 If there
is any risk on the part of the company, it is similar to the risk taken in
a deferred annuity contract.

5. Insurance with Annuity Policies
At present, policies are being issued on an installment premium
basis providing for an annuity at a certain age to an insured or annuitant,
Estate of Wilson v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A., No. 1So ( 1940).
(D. C. Minn. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 567.
48
The court said, "The contract is based upon a savings plan so as to obtain
enough credit with the society at the age of sixty, or before if the annuitant elects, that
the society will issue a supplemental certificate providing for the payment of the
stipulated annuity. The so-called insurance feature is not only contingently so, but is
clearly incidental to the primary purpose of the contract. A purchase of an annuity
from some one other than an insurance company on the installment plan, with the provision that the installments should be returned to a designated assignee if the annuitant
did not live until the age when the annuity should begin, would scarcely be considered
life insurance." In re Walsh, (D. C. Minn. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 567 at 573. See also
In re Bowers, (D. C. Pa. 1934) I I. F. Supp. 848, reversed by Bowers v. Reinhard,
(C. C. A. 3d, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 776.
49
Moskowitz v. Davis, (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 818.
50
See section 3, supra.
111 The labels placed on the contracts should not be determinative of tax results.
Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 54 S. Ct. 325 (1934); Aluminum Castings
Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92, 51 S. Ct. II (1930). Furthermore, whether a particular transaction is an insurance transaction for other purposes depends on the real nature
of the transaction rather than upon superficial considerations of names and forms.
Commonwealth ex rel. v. Fidelity Land Value Assurance Co., 312 Pa. 425, 167 A.
300 (1933). See cases collected in 63 A. L. R. 711 (1929); 100 A. L. R. 1449
(1936); 119 A. L. R. 1241 (1939). Nor should the classification of the contract by
the insurance company be final. Ackerman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, I 5
B. T. A. 635 (1929); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner' of Internal Revenue,
(C. C. A. 1st, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 380, and cases cited in note 34, supra.
.fB
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but if the death of the insured ( who may not be the annuitant) occurs
during the deferred period the face amount of the policy will be paid
to a beneficiary. Various options which can be exercised by either the
annuitant or the purchaser are offered. Upon maturity, cash, a paid-up
insurance policy, or other benefits rather than an annuity can be chosen.
This type of policy has been designated by various names, including
"endowment continuous monthly income policy," "special retirement
endowment," "retirement income endowment," "retirement endowment," "endowment with life income," "life income endowment," "endowment annuity," and "personal retirement policy."
Since the payments at maturity are not upon the death of the insured, they present no problem in relation to the estate and inheritance
taxes. But a certain amount of doubt might possibly arise concerning
the death benefit.
Several different analyses of the policy in connection with this
feature are possible. The matter is complicated by the fact that the
cash value of the contract reaches and exceeds the face value before the
maturity of the policy. This result follows from the fact that the value
of the annuity promised at the maturity date is greater than the face
amount, and the cash value ( or the reserve value) at the maturity
date must equal the value on that date of the annuity promised. If the
insured dies shortly before the maturity date, the proceeds payable
will ordinarily be greater than the face value because the agreement is
to pay him. the face amount or the cash value, whichever is higher.
If that promise is not embodied in the contract, he would in the above
situation receive only the face amount of the contract and thus less than
the reserve value. The matter is further complicated by the fact that
the face amount payable at death before maturity, as compared to the
value of the annuity, is arbitrarily fixed by the insurance company so
that the point at which the reserve value exceeds the face amount will
depend upon the specific policy being issued by the insurance company
at any particular time.
It is at once seen that this contract is somewhat similar to a retirement or deferred annuity, but instead of the cash value being payable
at death before maturity, the face amount is so payable ( unless the
cash value is greater). The policy might conceivably be regarded as
ordinary endowment insurance of the face amount maturing before the
time the annuity is to commence ( the maturity date) with the total
cash or investment value from that time accumulating at interest along
with additional premiums paid until maturity. Or it could be regarded
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as a deferred annuity supplemented by decreasing term insurance, the
benefit payable before maturity consisting of an insurance element and
a return of the premium paid for a deferred annuity. In such case the
whole payment might be regarded as consisting of insurance proceeds.
Another possibility is to treat the policy as endowment insurance maturing when the annuity commences and a deferred annuity representing
the difference between the face amount of the contract and the price
of the annuity guaranteed. 52
In any event, it appears there will always be an insurance elementa life insurance element-present until the cash value of the policy
( the investment side of the contract) equals or exceeds the face amount
of the policy sometime before maturity. 58 The company takes the risk
that in the event of death it will have to pay out more than it has
received. And because the company clearly takes an insurance risk
by furnishing this death protection until the face amount equals the
reserve value, it has probably been assumed that the death benefit
proceeds are life insurance proceeds. At least as to the payments before
the reserve value reaches the face amount, the endowment insurance
cases seem decisive of this case. 54
It does not seem out of place, however, to venture the suggestion
that since the investment element is of such importance, it might be
argued that the insurance feature is merely incidental. Or perhaps a
more pertinent course of action would be to attempt to isolate the insurance element. Whenever the proceeds are paid before the cash value
equals the face value, the amounts paid would be considered life insurance proceeds under such a procedure, but if the cash value has reached
52
These analyses are suggested in MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE, 5th ed., 72
(1939). See also HuEBNER and McCAHAN, LIFE INSURANCE AS INVESTMENT 32
(1933).
53
HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE, 3d ed., 195 (1935), explains clearly the basic
nature of the contract as insurance.
5
' An endowment insurance policy is said to be a life insurance policy and the
proceeds payable at death are life insurance proceeds. In re Weick, (C. C. A. 6th,
1924) 2 F. (2d) 647; In re Horwitz, (D. C. N. Y. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 16; Heffelfinger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 991,
cert. den. 302 U. S. 690, 58 S. Ct. IO (1937); In re Booss, (D. C. Pa. 1907) 154
F. 494; Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U.S. 252, 9 S. Ct. 295 (1889); Holden v. Stratton,
198 U. S. 202, 25 S. Ct. 656 (1905); Endowment & Benevolent Assn. v. State, 35
Kan. 253, IO P. 872 (1886); State v. Federal Investment Co., 48 Minn. uo, 50
N. W. 1028 (1892); Briggs v. McCullough, 36 Cal. 542 (1869); Bailey v. Wood,
202 Mass. 549, 89 N. E. 147 (1909); Baron v. Brummer, 100 N. Y. 372, 3 N. E.
474 (1885); Flood v. Libby, 38 Wash. 366, So P. 533 (1905); VANCE, INSURANCE,
2d ed., 547 (1930); I CooLEY, BRIEFS oN INSURANCE 783 (1927).
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the face value, the amounts paid would not be considered insurance
proceeds. The test would then be whether at the time of death the
insurance company took any risk in connection with the policy that
constituted a life insurance risk.
Administration of the tax acts would be made more difficult and
complicated by use of such a test, however. And in no other type of
life insurance has there been any attempt to separate the investment
element from the death protection element in connection with the taxation of insurance proceeds under the estate and inheritance taxes.115
When the policy shows a life insurance element in connection with
death benefits, it would appear to be taxable as a life insurance policy
until maturity.

6. Annuity with Death Benefit Contracts
Upon the payment of a single premium, policies have been issued
in which the insurance company agrees to pay to a named beneficiary
upon the death of the insured or the annuitant a face amount slightly
less than the amount of the premium. Until the annuitant or insured
dies the company promises him a guaranteed periodical payment approximating from two to five per cent of the amount of the death
benefit. In contrast to the policies discussed in the previous section, the
annuity and death benefit features are in force concurrently rather than
alternatively. Usually there is a cash surrender value to the amount of
the death benefit and a privilege to change the beneficiaries. Options
of settlement are included. These contracts also have been labeled in
a variety of ways, including, "life annuity with principal sum payable
at death," "life annuity with death benefit," "participating life income
policy," "investment annuity," and "guaranteed annuity paymentminimum death refund." They are sometimes referred to as "life insurance and annuity" contracts.
Superficially these contracts resemble a single premium cash refund
annuity contract, but here a face amount is to be paid as a death benefit
1515 The term "investment" as here used refers to the savings or accumulation element of life insurance policies which is usually available to some extent to the insured
through loan and surrender provisions. VANCE, lNsuRANCE, 2d ed., 26-27, 54-56
{1930).
In a little different sense, the death protection element has been declared
separable from the investment element for the purposes of the income tax. These
rulings, however, involved separation of the contract into an annuity contract and a life
insurance feature. See note 56, infra.
See, however, Estate of Thompson, 41 B. T. A. 901 (1940).
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rather than an amount equal to the consideration less the total sum
already paid out in annuity payments. They can be analyzed as a combination of a single premium immediate life annuity and a single
premium whole-life insurance policy. And very often the insurance
company will allocate the premium in the contract to each feature. The
resulting premiums are the same ordinarily as would be paid for a
separate life annuity and a separate whole life policy of the same
amounts. Even the reserves may be carried separately by the insurance
company. No medical examination is required, however. At the same
time if the contract is considered as a whole, the death benefit can be
looked upon as a return of the premium paid and the periodical payments as either annuity payments or payments of guaranteed interest.
The contract could then be considered a single premium life annuity
with a principal sum payable at death, or an "investment" contract
with the payment of guaranteed interest.
Since the result for estate and inheritance tax purposes ( as well as
income tax purposes) depends upon what analysis of the contract is
chosen, several conflicting views are reflected in the cases. In so far as
particular jurisdictions are concerned the matter has been decided, but
the decisions on the whole leave the result somewhat in doubt.
An early federal ruling, now revoked, decided that this type of
contract could be separated for the purposes of the income tax into two
contracts-a single premium life annuity and a single premium life
insurance policy, the premium to be allocated between these features for
tax purposes. Go Then in connection with the income tax the government
in the case of Bodinev. Commissioner of Internal RevenueG1 contended
that the contract was either a single premium annuity contract with a
return of premiums paid at death or a combination annuity and insurance contract. In either case section 22 (b) ( 2) of the Revenue Act of
1932 was then applicable. The taxpayer asserted that the contract was
a "deposit" contract with the payment of guaranteed interest, but his
claim was rejected. While the case was, therefore, not a decision that
the death benefit proceeds were to be considered life insurance proceeds,
it seems clear that the court so considered them, and that it thought
the contract was divisible. 68 This position is directly supported by the
58

G. C. M. 6395, VIII-I CuM. BuLL. (INT. REv. BuLL.) 67 (1929). See
also S. M. 3434, IV-I CuM. BuLL. 29 (1925).
7
G (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 982, affirming 36 B. T. A. 1328 (1937),
cert. den. 308 U.S. 576, 60 S. Ct. 92 (1939).
58 The question considered was whether the gains. realized by virture of payments
not returned in previous years and payment upon surrender of the contract were tax:-
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Ohio case of Bowman v. Tax Commission 59 in which an annuity with
death benefit contract was held to be divisible. In this case the court
decided that the periodical payments were taxable as annuity payments
under the Ohio intangibles tax to the extent of four per cent of onehalf of the premium allocated to the annuity feature. These decisions
find support mainly in the fact that they follow the actuarial analysis
and treatment accorded such contracts by the insurance companies.
Taking the element of risk as essential to a life insurance contract,
however, other decisions have announced the preferable rule that these
contracts for the purposes of taxation are not divisible and therefore
involve no risk to the insurance company in connection with the death
benefit. 60 This result was reached although the courts took express
able under the pertinent section of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 178, § 22
(a) (2), which excluded from gross revenue "Amounts received , , • under a life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract ..• if such amounts (when added to amounts
received before the taxable year under such contract) exceed the aggregate premiums
or consideration paid (whether or not paid during the taxable year) then the excess
shall be included in gross income." The government claimed that the amounts were
taxable whether the contract was an annuity contract only or whether it was a combined insurance and annuity contract. In agreeing with this contention the court said,
"The contract under consideration therefore possesses dual characteristics. It is a life
annuity in that it was terminable by the death of the annuitant and was a term annuity
since it was terminable by the voluntary action of the annuitant. The whole of the sums
paid by the insurance company to the taxpayer, including the monthly payments and
the principal sum of $50,000, constitute the totality of the annuity. But the contract
is not only a contract of annuity, it also possesses the characteristics of a single premium
straight life insurance contract. Most, if not all, of the characteristics of the contract
lie within the two categories named and we are therefore of the opinion that the sums
paid by the company to the taxpayer are within the purview of Section 22(b)(2)."
Bodine v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 982 at
985, affirming 36 B. T. A. 1328 (1937). The court stated that the case was practically
on all fours with the case of Ballou v. Fisher, 154 Ore. 548, 61 P. (2d) 423 (1936),
but in their opinion that case combined the characteristics of annuity contracts and
single premium straight life insurance contracts.
However in their petition for certiorari, counsel for the taxpayer made the claim
that the decision was in conflict with Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 1st, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 380, where it was said that the
death benefit proceeds were not life insurance proceeds under the federal estate tax.
Certiorari was denied, Bodine v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 576,
60 S. Ct. 92 (1939). There was no conflict if the contract was considered an annuity
contract with a return of premium paid. If the contract was considered a combination policy, there would be no conflict on the narrower ground that two different statutes
were involved.
59
135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916 (1939), affirming 61 Ohio App. 163,
22 N. E. (2d) 524 (1938) (three justices dissented).
60
The first case adopting this viewpoint was State ex rel. Thornton v. Probate
Court, 186 Minn. 351, 243 N. W. 389 (1932), noted 17 MINN. L. REv. 454
(19;12). It was held that the death benefit proceeds were not to be treated as insurance
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notice of the fact that the insurance companies treat the two features
of the policy separately in every way.
Whether the contract is taken to be an annuity contract with a
guaranteed refund, or a sort of "deposit" contract with payments of
guaranteed interest, it would appear that the company takes no life
insurance risk upon the payment of the death benefit. Ordinarily the
single premium is equal to the death benefit plus a loading charge of
five per cent. The periodical payments equal a very low interest rate
upon the principal amount. Thus the company merely takes the risk
that it will not earn the guaranteed interest rate. This risk is not one
connected with the death of the annuitant or insured, but is merely an
investment or business risk. 61 A further feature often incorporated in
these contracts is a promise by the company that the amount returned
upon the death of the purchaser or annuitant, together with the interest
or periodical payments already made, will never be less than the original permium paid. If the purchaser dies soon after the policy is issued,
therefore, the company may lose because of the expenses incurred when
the contract is issued. However, this risk is very small and as a matter
of practice is ignored by the companies in the determination of rates
and values. It is also a business risk. The purchaser here receives no
more than he had paid in. Even if the contracts provided that the insurance feature could be surrendered without the surrender of the
annuity feature, no life insurance risk would result. The company
proceeds under the Minnesota inheritance tax. In Ballou v. Fisher, I 54 Ore'. 548,
61 P. (2d) 423 (1936), the court had before it the issue of whether the contract was
an annuity contract under the provisions of the Oregon intangibles income tax law.
The decision rejected the view that the contract was divisible and the court stated it
was neither an annuity nor an insurance policy. A leading case is Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 1st, 1939) l02 F. (2d) 380,
affirming 37 B. T. A. 435 (1938). The court based its decision squarely on the point
that there was no life insurance risk in the sense that there was no risk to the company
upon the contingency of death. This case is discussed in 5 2 HARV. L. REv. I I 80
(1939); 38 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1940); 49 YALE L. J. 946 (1940). The same result
was reached in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 37
B. T. A. 535 (1938); Schultz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 38 B. T. A.
59 (1938).
The question is settled for the federal courts by Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U.S.
1941) 61 S. Ct. 646, and Keller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U. S. 1941),
6 I S. Ct. 6 5 I, discussed infra, p. 8 8 5.
Most of these cases were cited by G. C. M. 21716, 1940-1 CuM. BULL. 82,
which rules that annuity with death benefit contracts constitute agreements for the
payment of interest or earnings rather than for the payment of annuities under the
income tax. G. C. M. 6395, VIII-I CuM. BuLL. 67 (1929) is thus revoked.
81 See HUEBNER and McCAHAN, LIFE INSURANCE AS INVESTMENT 32 (1933).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

would then be taking the risk that the purchaser would live too long,
but no risk upon his death.
In relation to the estate and inheritance taxes, the choice of the risk
element as decisive of the nature of these death benefit provisions seems
especially desirable. Not only do the remarks concerning risk as a test
of life insurance made in connection with refund annuities apply,6 2
but additional policy considerations make this element pertinent. To
the extent of the insurance exemption, the purchaser would be able to
make a nontaxable provision for beneficiaries through the use of these
contracts if they were considered divisible. Yet the transaction accomplishes exactly the same results as other inter vivas transfers which are
taxable. The amount that is transferred to the insurance company would
pass on his death to those he had designated, he would in effect retain
an income from such amount, and would have it at his entire command
until his death.
It should be mentioned that these contracts have never been very
popular and their issuance has been discontinued by many companies.
The rate of return is very low and they meet the needs of relatively
few purchasers. In fact, the chief attraction would be the limited possibilities of tax avoidance if they were considered combination insurance
and annuity policies.
A similar type of policy is being issued with a death benefit to the
amount of a certain percentage of the premium paid ( usually fifty per
cent). In addition to the features contained in an ordinary annuity with
death benefit contract they contain a surrender clause providing not
only for a surrender value to the amount of the death benefit, but also
for the continuance of the annuity at a reduced amount. This type of
contract might also be analyzed as an annuity combined with life insurance. On the other hand, it can be analyzed as a straight life annuity
plus a deposit of the rest of the premium. In such case the death benefit
would be the return of the amount on deposit, and the periodical payments would consist of the annuity payments plus a low rate of guaranteed interest on the deposited amount. 63
In connection with the payment of the death benefit, the company
takes no risk dependent upon the life contingency of the annuitant. It
merely returns part of the amount paid in on the contract. While a risk
62

See section 3, supra.
"Rather, one-half the premium is used to purchase a straight life annuity and
the other half is held by the insurance company on deposit. Earnings from the half of
the premium held on deposit are used to increase the annuity payments purchased by
the other half of the premium." MAGEE, LIFE lNsuRANCE 472 (1939).
68
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dependent upon life contingency is taken in connection with the contract, it is an annuity risk-a risk that the annuitant will live too long.
The opinion has already been expressed that death benefits are not
life insurance proceeds merely because paid in connection with a contract covering such a risk. 64
The conclusion suggested in regard to the other type of annuity
with death benefit contract mentioned above should therefore be
reached here.

7. Life Insurance Policies Issued Only in Connect-ion with
Annuity Policies
The issuance of annuity with death benefit policies has been to some
extent superseded by a plan under which the company will issue a
single premium whole life insurance policy but only in connection with
a single premium immediate life annuity. The policies are issued upon
a nonmedical basis and it is required that the total purchase price of
both contracts shall be about ten per cent greater than the face amount
of the insurance.
In form they are entirely independent and the premiums for each
policy are set at standard rates. They are treated by the insurance company as independent in every way. 65 While the annuity contract has no
surrender privilege, the insurance contract may have the usual surrender values.
No difficulty arises to bar the conclusion that this transaction is similar to an annuity with death benefit contract except in form and some
insignificant details. If the transaction is treated as separable for tax
purposes, there is undoubtedly a life insurance risk-the risk that the
company will have to pay more upon the insured's death than it has
received from him. 66 If it is to be considered as an indivisible transaction,
there would appear to be no more risk taken by the insurance company
44

See section 3, supra.
Not only are the premiums the same as in ordinary policies, but the reserves
are calculated separately, the annuity contract may be issued without the insurance
policy, the insurance policy can be surrendered without affecting the annuity policy,
either policy may be assigned without the other, neither contract refers to the other
and each states it is a single independent contract on its face. The only connection
between the policies is the fact that the c9mpany will not issue the insurance policy
unless it issues a single premium life annuity upon the life of the insured.
66
Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 646, reversing (C. C. A.
2d, 1940) IIO F. (2d) 734; Keller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U. S.
1941) 61 S. Ct. 651, affirming (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 833.
65
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than in the case of an annuity with death benefit. 67 In the ordinary case
of life insurance the death protection element is covered through the
funds paid in by the group of policyholders, but here the death payments are merely an amount less than the amount paid upon both
contracts by the purchaser. Under these plans the combined amounts
are greater than the face amount of the insurance to the extent of loading amounts, and the annuity is equal to a very small guaranteed interest
rate on.such face amount. In this case, as in the case of an annuity with
death benefit contracts, if the annuitant or insured dies shortly after
the transaction is completed, the company in paying the death benefit
(plus any ,previous periodical payments paid) may suffer a slight loss.
But this slight risk of loss taken by the company results from expenses
of issuing and selling the two policies and is a business risk. It is in
no sense related to calculations based upon the mortality tables and,
as stated before, in practice is disregarded in calculating the premiums.
Furthermore, the total premiums required under this type of transaction have been increased in recent years to reduce this loss through the
expense incurred by the company.
A difference between these contracts and the annuity with death
benefit contract is found in the surrender feature. The insurance contract here contains increasing surrender values less than the face amount
as in any ordinary single premium insurance policy. Upon its surrender,
the annuity remains in force. Under an annuity with death benefit
contract, usually the entire face value is the surrender value, and upon
surrender both features of the contract are terminated. However, this
difference is not material in relation to any life insurance risk contingent upon the death of the annuitant or insured. Upon the surrender
of the life insurance policy, the reserve calculated separately (less surrender charge) is withdrawn. The annuity remains in force, but its
reserve has been also calculated separately. The company upon such
surrender may bear a risk in connection with life contingency, but it is
a risk that the annuitant will live very long, and is not a risk contingent
upon premature death. It is a risk contingent upon life.68 Since the
loading element has been taken care of in the calculation of the
premium for each contract, the risk upon surrender in connection with
67 Helvering v. Tyler, (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) I II F. (2d) 422, affirmed per stipulation of counsel to abide by the Supreme Court decisions in the Le Gierse and Keller
cases; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller, (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), 113 F. (2d)
833, affirmed Keller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 651;
Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 646.
68
See pages 866-867, supra, and cases in note 66, supra.
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expenses is only a business risk. Because the surrender value is less
than the face amount, the face value is payable only upon the contingency of death. But the company takes no risk in paying this amount.
The Board of Tax Appeals, when faced with this transaction, held
that the death proceeds were subject to the insurance exemption and
were to be treated as life insurance proceeds. 69 It distinguished this situation from the Old Colony Trust Company case by attaching controlling importance to the independent features of the policies. On the
basis of contract law, and the separate treatment given each policy in
every way by the insurance company, except for the requirement at
issuance, it thought the case was sufficiently different from an annuity
with death benefit contract. 70 The several decisions to this effect by the
board were appealed, and three decisions were handed down. 71 The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the case of Com-missioner of Internal Revenue v. Le Gierse,72 held that the contracts
should be deemed independent because the parties so intended and the
taxpayer should be allowed to decrease his taxes by means which the
law permits. But in the cases of Helvering v. Tyler 73 and Commissioner v. Keller's Estate,7'4, the courts looked through the form of the
transaction and declared that there was no pecuniary risk in respect
to the duration of the taxpayer's life.
All three cases were then appealed to the Supreme Court, which
recently held, with two justices dissenting, that the death benefits were
not insurance proceeds for estate tax purposes but were to be taxed as
transfers in possession and enjoyment at or after death. 75 The Court
69
Estate of Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1047 (1939); Estate of Le Gierse, 39 B. T. A.
u34 (1939); Estate of Tyler, 39 B. T. A. 1244 (1939).
70 The board said that even if the decedent and the insurance company had
executed the agreement in one policy, each feature would have to be considered separable and cited Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v. Deem, (C. C. A.
4th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 569, cert. den. Deem v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
302 U. S. 744, 58 S. Ct. 146 (1937); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. McClellan, (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 445; Downey v. German Alliance Ins. Co.,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1918) 252 F. 701; Legg v. St. John, 296 U. S. 489, 56 S. Ct. 336
(1936).
71
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller's Estate, (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) II3
F. (2d) 833; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Le Gierse, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940)
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 40 B. T. A. 1377 (1939) (memo decision) (appeal pending). See 49 YALE L. J. 946 (1940) and 40 CoL. L. REv. 86
(1940).
72
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) uo F. (2d) 734.
73
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940) III F. (2d) 422.
74
(C. C. A. 3d, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 833.
75
Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 646; Keller v. Commissioner
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pointed out that life insurance in a legal and technical sense, as well as
in common parlance, involves risk shifting and risk distributing, and
that Congress must have taken such meaning in adopting section 302
(g). It refused to consider the contracts separately and held that the
combination of risks under the policies neutralized any risk. It disposed
of the contention in the Keller case, that the consideration demanded
for both policies was smaller than the total amounts paid out, by stating
that the resulting risk was a business risk occasioned by miscalculation
of premiums, expenses, or investment return on the principal.
While the status of death benefits under this type of transaction
and the status of death benefits under annuity with death benefits contracts is thus settled for the purposes of the federal tax, authority for a
different treatment still exists in other jurisdictions. 76
Looking to contract law, it appears that there is warrant for considering the contracts separately. The transa€tion outlined has been in
use for some time and can be looked upon primarily as an insurance
transaction in that it is a means of obtaining life insurance upon a nonrp.edical basis. 77 Furthermore, the result of the transaction, in so far as
the individual purchaser is concerned, is no different than if he had
taken out a separate insurance policy by passing a medical examination
and a separate annuity policy. In such case there would be little warrant
for claiming that the insurance policy was not an insurance policy with
a risk element. Such a course would be avoiding the tax by permissible
means. The same might be said of the purchase of insurance and annuity contracts at different times from the same company or at the same
time from different companies.
In spite of such arguments, however, it appears that the Supreme
Court was justified in considering the two contracts as one. As pointed
out by the circuit court of appeals in the Tyler case, the transaction
is exactly the same as if the purchaser had transferred an amount' to
the insurance company and the insurance company had promised to
deliver the same amount to the beneficiary upon his death. 78 The section
of Internal Revenue, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 651. The Tyler case was affirmed through
stipulation of counsel to abide by the decisions in the Le Gierse and Keller cases.
76
Bowman v. Tax Commission, 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916 (1939),
affirming 61 Ohio App. 163, 22 N. E. (2d) 524 (1938) (annuity with death benefit
contract).
77 The lower court in the Le Gierse case evidently had this consideration in
mind.
78
"If a scrivener had been called in to draw up the contract detailing what Mr.
Tyler agreed to do in respect to his $44,000 and what the company agreed to do in
consideration of the receipt of the money, an entire writing would have plainly
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exempting insurance proceeds could not have been adopted merely to
protect payments at death, because the act under the conditions in these
contracts imposes a tax upon other transfers taking effect at death. The
Supreme Court therefore chose the crucial risk element in identifying
the transaction.
In respect to arguments regarding combinations set up by the sole
action of the taxpayer, it can be admitted that the cases were in the
"twilight zone." The distinction between these cases and combinations
set up by the taxpayer is found in the requirements of the insurance
company. As Justice Murphy stated, the company itself under the
combination plan has made sure that it wiII carry no risk contingent
upon the death of the insured. In its scheme of insurance business it
has seen to it that no loss wiII be incurred in relation to the death benefit. On the other hand, when the taxpayer himself selects whoIIy independent contracts, the company agrees to carry the risks separately and
makes no provision to protect itself in respect to the death benefit. The
distinction is iIIustrated by a person who could not obtain life insurance
because he was an uninsurable risk. He could not obtain ordinary insurance yet he could take out the policies in the type of transaction
herein considered. In the combination cases, the mere form of an
insurance contract is used, but the company in the one transaction incurs
no risk. That cannot be said whenever the company independently
issues an insurance contract irrespective of what other contracts it may
issue to the same person. The statute refers to proceeds received as
insurance proceeds on policies taken out by the decedent upon his own
life. 7g Whether the proceeds from any policy are insurance depends
upon both a transaction resulting in issuance of such policy and the
results in respect to risk. It must be remembered that the matter is one
of statutory interpretation and application. Merely because the taxpayer could avoid the death tax by foIIowing his own private schemes
does not mean that he should be aIIowed to enter into a single tran~action which involves no real plan of insurance.
8. Joint Life Annuity Contracts
A joint life annuity embodies a promise by the insurance company
to pay an annuity during the joint lifetime of two or more persons, the
shown a transfer to the company of $44,000 on account of which $40,000 was (among
other things) to be delivered to the widow at the death of the transferor." Helvering
v. Tyler, (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 422 at 426.
79
lnternal Revenue Code, § 811 (g), 53 Stat. L. 122 (1939).
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payments to cease and the contract to terminate upon the first death
of any joint annuitant. There being no death benefits, no occasion arises
for any estate or inheritance tax.

9. Joint and Survivor Annuity Contracts
Not to be confused with reversionary or survivorship annuity policies, these contracts are of two principal types. The type usually called
joint and last survivor annuities provide for annuity payments to two
or more persons jointly during their joint lifetime, the payments to
continue to the survivors or survivor for life. In some contracts the
annuity to the survivor will be at a reduced amount. Contracts called
survivorship annuities or longer life annuities provide for payments to
a first annuitant for life and to a second annuitant for life if he survives the first annuitant.
The so-called joint and last survivor annuities appear to have no
life insurance element, for they are similar to other annuity policies.
They involve two or more lives rather than one. They could be thought
of as an annuity for the entire amount to the annuitant who is the
youngest. But the annuity will be paid to the joint annuitants, rather
than to the annuitant who has the longest span of years under the mortality tables. Rather than the creation of an estate at the death of an
annuitant, they involve through the entire life of the contract the
liquidation of an estate. Investment is the prime object. There is no
risk contingent upon the death of any of the annuitants. The only risk
taken is that the joint annuitants will outlive their normal life span.
No medical examination is required. The policies are treated and classified by all companies as annuity policies and not as life insurance
policies.
Nevertheless in the case of In re Wilson's Estate,8° decided in the
surrogate's court of New York county, New Yark, an ordinary joint
and last survivorship annuity was regarded as an insurance policy and
the proceeds upon the death of one of the two annuitants were declared
to be insurance proceeds under the New Yark transfer tax. The policy
considered there was irrevocable, and could not be altered or amended
by either or both of the annuitants. Upon the death of the first annuitant the state contended that the benefit passed as a taxable transfer to
the second annuitant. Plaintiff's counsel argued that the contract was
irrevocable and there was no transfer at death, but the court in addition
so 143 Misc. 742, 257 N. Y. S. 230 (1931).
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stated there could be no tax under the rule that the proceeds of life
insurance payable to named beneficiaries at the time of death were not
taxable.
From what has·already been said it would appear that this reasoning is erroneous. In the Sothern case before the appellate division 81
the case was distinguished because the contract was irrevocable, whereas
the contract there was revocable. To the extent that the case is authority
for the proposition that joint and last survivor annuity proceeds to the
survivor are insurance proceeds under the statute, however, it appears
to be overruled by the Sothern case because in both cases the contracts
were annuity contracts involving no risk upon the contingency of death.
The policy, in view of the Wilson case, could be thought of as a joint
life insurance policy, the proceeds to be paid to the survivor in the form
of an annuity, combined with a joint annuity until the death of the
first annuitant. But as indicated this analysis appears artificial.
In the case of the annuity contracts which pay the survivor only
what he received before the death of the first annuitant, there would
be no question because nothing could be said to pass at the first death.
If the contract was purchased by the annuitant who dies, it would be
a gift inter vivos.
A contract of the survivorship or longer life type was before the
Board of Tax Appeals in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner. 82 Although the board decided that the proceeds on the death
of the first annuitant were not taxable, it evidently thought the contracts were not insurance contracts. In any event it would appear that
the discussion above applies.
IO.

Reversionary or Survivorship Annuity Policies and
Similar Types

These contracts provide that upon the death of the insured the
beneficiary of the contract shall receive periodical payments of a fixed
amount for life. But if the insured outlives the beneficiary the policy
expires. A medical examination is required of the insured. They definitely appear to be life insurance policies. There is a risk taken by the
insurance company contingent upon the death of the insured. Upon the
death of the insured the company must have on hand the value of the
81 Matter of Sothern's Estate, 257 App. Div. 574, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) I (1939),
affg. 170 Misc. 805, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 509 (1938), discussed supra, at note 13.
82
37 B. T. A. 535 (1938), appeal dismissed, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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annuity to be paid the beneficiary if the beneficiary is then living. Since
that value decreases every year, the policy is one of decreasing insurance and the proceeds in the form of the annuity are therefore to be
treated as life insurance proceeds. 83
Deferred survivorship annuity policies are governed by essentially
the same principles. These contracts are similar to reversionary annuities but in addition the payments to the beneficiary are not to begi~
until a definite length of time after the death of the insured, if the insured dies within a certain length of time after the policy is issued.
The life income policy should also be mentioned. It is similar to
a reversionary annuity except for the fact that a definite number of
periodical payments to the beneficiary are guaranteed. Should the
beneficiary not survive the insured, the premiums are reduced and the
benefits paid to alternative beneficiaries. Family income policies are
also to be considered life insurance policies.
Other Types of Contracts
Other contracts which are rather difficult to analyze are sometimes
issued, but the popular forms have been covered. Often these less common policies are merely combinations of other types. At the same time
many other types of policies with death benefits are issued which will
easily be recognized as life insurance policies.
Annuity contracts issued as supplementary contracts in connection
with options for payment of death benefits of life insurance contracts
present 'no difficulty here. The proceeds received are to be considered
insurance proceeds just as if payment had been made in a lump sum. 84
I I.

12.

Conclusion

In order to classify any particular policy for inheritance and estate
tax purposes, the definition of insurance might be made broad enough
to include any contracts issued by insurance companies or at least any
contracts where amounts are payable at death. 85 Annuity contracts with
death benefits would then be insurance contracts for tax purposes. If
insurance were so narrowly defined that it included only policies with
83

See note 84, infra.
Treas. Reg. 80, art. 28 (1937). See Estate of Chisholm, 37 B. T. A. 167
(1938). Commissioner v. Winslow, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 418, and related
cases concerning the income tax do not appear applicable here.
85 Either on the basis that all annuity contracts are insurance contracts as suggested previously or on the basis that they are insurance contracts if they have death
benefits, it could be said that death benefits are insurance proceeds under the statutes.
84
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no investment element, benefit payments at the death of the annuitant
would not be considered insurance proceeds. Either extreme position is
unsound. The courts have refused to extend preferences in the treatment of insurance proceeds to funds payable in connection with annuity
contracts,88 and at the same time, they have declared that for tax and
other purposes endowment insurance policies are insurance policies
although containing a large investment element.87
It seems doubtful whether the test of insurance for estate and inheritance tax purposes should be framed in terms of the treatment
accorded it by the insurance company. 88 Such treatment should be considered, but if made final the distinction between insurance proceeds
and other funds would become a matter of form. Furthermore the attitude of the purchaser of the policy should not be the decisive factor.
He may regard a policy as insurance, talcing it out for the primary purpose of protecting his dependents, even though it is merely a pure
investment policy similar to a bank deposit.
Both the technical and the common meanings of life insurance denote some death protection element. Life insurance policies as ordinarily understood provide an element of protection against premature
death, the insurance company at some time during the life of the policy
being obligated to pay out to a beneficiary more than the cash value
of the policy in case of death of the insured at that time.89 Such a principle is supported by the cases, except possibly the Wilson case. 00 Should
any criterion be adopted framed in words of "primarily investment"
or "primarily death protection," confusion will result.
The test above suggested will also lead to a salutary result in tax
law enforcement. Transactions clearly insurance are afforded exemptions, but transactions which could easily be made use of primarily to
distribute estates are given no such preference. Policies now being
issued are fairly standardized as to general types, and application of
the rule suggested, though perhaps in some cases difficult, would on
the whole be feasible.
See cases in notes 20 and 34, supra.
See note 54, supra.
88 Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 646; Keller v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 651; Helvering v. Tyler, (C. C. A. 8th,
1940) I I I F. (2d) 422, affirmed per agreement of counsel to abide by the decisions in
the Keller and Le Gierse cases. See note, 27 VA. L. REv. 237 (1940).
89
See note 35, supra.
00
In re Wilson's Estate, 143 Misc. 742, 257 N. Y. S. 230 (1931), discussed at
note 80, supra.
86

87
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II
TAXATION OF ANNUITY CONTRACT DEATH BENEFITS UNDER
THE GENERAL CLAUSES

If funds payable at the death of an annuitant under a particular
annuity contract are not to be treated as life insurance proceeds for the
purpose of estate and inheritance taxation, peculiar questions remain
in regard to the treatment of these contracts under the general clauses
of the statutes. In view of the nature of the contract, the chief problem
seems to be whether the proceeds to be paid upon the death of an annuitant are taxable under conditions comparable to those found in other
taxable transactions.
I.

Contracts Revocable by the Annuitant or Purchaser

Whenever the purchaser of an annuity contract or the annuitant
retains the right to alter or amend the contract by reserving the right
to change the beneficiary of death benefit provisions retaining a surrender privilege, it would appear that the payment of proceeds at death
to the beneficiary is a taxable transfer to take effect in possession and
enjoyment at or after death to the same extent as a transfer by a revocable trust. Or it might be said that the death benefits could be considered part of the estate of the decedent passing to the beneficiary.
However, in determining the applicability of the general statutory
clauses to these revocable annuity contracts, there is an initial difficulty
in bringing transfers effected by annuity contracts within the statutes
to any extent. As a matter of statutory construction of the phrase "or
otherwise" in the federal estate tax statute 91 and similar state statutes,
it can be argued that all transfers by means of annuity transactions are
excluded. 92 However, this argument appears rather artificial, and ad91 Sec. 8 I I of the Internal Revenue Code states, "The value of the gross estate
of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death
of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real
property situated outside the United States ..• (c) ... To the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise •••
(d) Revocable Transfers-(!) ... To the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer ... by trust or otherwise •.. (2) ... To
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer, by trust or otherwise ...." 53 Stat. L. 121 (1939), 26 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939),

§ 8II.
92

.

It might be said that the rule of ejusdem generis is applicable restricting the
general words "or otherwise." Resort could also be had to the further rule that taxing
statutes are construed against the taxing authority.
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mittedly the phrase is a "catch all" including every type of transfer
which meets the other requirements of the section. 08 Where the state
statutes are worded to include all property passing "by deed, grant, or
gift" made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the death of the granter, a somewhat similar argument might be
made. 04 It could be said that there is no passing of property by deed,
grant, or gift, but instead, all that passes to the ,beneficiary is a contract
right which passes at once. The receipt of the death benefits would
then be by reason of a contract right vested in the beneficiary. 05 This
argument can be extended further and the conclusion can be drawn
that there is no transfer of property. It could be said that a third party,
the insurance company, intervenes and that any transfer of property is
between the annuitant and the insurance company in the first place.
The payment at death again is by virtue of a contract right of the beneficiary against the insurance company. 96
98 If there is any transfer at all it would fall clearly within the words "or otherwise." The rule that every part of a statute should be given effect if possible could be
applied to support the result. The clear ordinary meaning of the words would tend to
show that more than transfers in trust are indicated.
The problem, however, cannot be solved by mere application of rules of statutory
construction, many of which are contradictory. Other types of transfers have actually
been included within these sections. Thus while there has been some controversy among
writers, it has been held that a transfer by assignment of insurance policies in contemplation of death is taxable under § 8 II (c). Billings v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 35 B. T. A. u47 (1937). A similar decision was reached under state law in
In re Einstein's Estate, II4 Misc. 452, 186 N. Y. S. 931 (1921), affirmed 201 App.
Div. 848, 193 N. Y. S. 931 (1922). See Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal
Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L. REV. 1037 at 1049-1051 (1939).
°' A typical statµte in this form reads, "All property, real, personal and mixed,
which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state ..• or any interest therein
or income therefrom, which shall be transferred by deed, grant, sale or gift made in
contemplation of the death of the grantor, or bargainer or intended to take effect,
in possession or enjoyment after such death . . . ." Neb. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1939),
§ 77-2201.
95
In holding that insurance payable to a named beneficiary is not taxable as a
transfer to take effect in enjoyment and possession at or after death, the court in Tyler
v. Treasurer, 226 Mass. 306 at 309, II5 N. E. 300 (1917), said, "The insured has
no title to the amount due on the policy. He does not and cannot make a gift of that.
The right to that amount as an instant obligation does not spring into existence until
after his death. Even then the money belongs to the insurer, who is charged with the
duty by the contract to pay the beneficiary. So far as the insured is a 'grantor,' to use
the word of the statute, the only thing which he grants or can grant is an interest in a
contract. So far as he can make a 'gift,' the only thing which he has to give is a right
in a contract. By designating a beneficiary both the 'grant' and the 'gift,' so far as
either exist at all, take effect in enjoyment and possession at once."
96
A similar objection in connection with insurance proceeds under revocable
policies was made in Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 at 337,
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Based upon the insurance cases concerning inheritance and estate
taxation, a still further objection can be made to the inclusion of annuity contracts within the statute. The position is founded upon the
rule, arrived at in the absence of statutory provisions, that insurance
payable to a named beneficiary is not taxable. 97 The primary reason
assigned for such result is that the beneficiary of an insurance contract
is said to have a vested right therein and acquires his interest at the time
the insurance is taken out. 98 Following the above rule where it is in
force, it might be said that the beneficiary of an annuity contract acquires
all of his rights at the time the contract is made by the annuitant, and
at the annuitant's death there is no occasion for any tax; under general
clauses.
However, even if it be granted that the beneficiary of an annuity
338, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929). In relation to the argument the Cpurt said, "But the
plaintiffs say that the tax here must be deemed a tax on property because the beneficiaries' interests in the policies were not transferred to them from the decedent, but
from the insurer, and hence there was nothing to which a transfer or privilege tax
could apply. Obviously, the word 'transfer' in the statute, or the privilege which may
constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense as to refer only
to the passing of particular items of property: directly from the decedent to the transferee. It must, we think, at least include the transfer of property procured through
expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass
to another. Sec. 402(c) taxes transfers made in contemplation of death. It would not,
we assume, be seriously argued that its provisions could be evaded by the purchase by
a decedent from a third person of property, a savings bank book for example, and its
delivery by the seller directly to the intended beneficiary on the purchaser's death, or
that the measure of the tax would be the cost and not the value or proceeds at the
time of death. • •• we think the power to tax the privilege of transfer at death cannot be controlled by the mere choice of the formalities which may attend the donor's
bestowal of benefits on another at death, or of the particular methods by which his
purpose is effected, so long as he retains control over these benefits with power to direct
their future enjoyment until his death. Termination of the power of control at the
time of death inures to the benefit of him who owns the property subject to the power
and thus brings about, at death, the completion of that shifting of the economic benefits
of property which is the real subject of the tax, just as effectively as would its exercise,
which latter may be subjected to a privilege tax."
This case was cited in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
16 B. T. A. 314 (1929), reversed by stipulation of counsel, no opinion, (C. C. A.
2d, 1931). The board held that a revocable refund annuity was within the general
clause.
97
See note 8, supra.
98
"The rights ~f the beneficiary are vested when the designation is made in
accordance with the terms of the contract of insurance. They take complete effect as
of that time. They do not wait for their efficacy upon the happening of a future event.
They are in no wise modified or increased at the time of the. death of the insured."
Tyler v. Treasurer, 226 Mass. 306 at 308, II5 N. E. 300 (1917). See discussion of
rights of a beneficiary under a revocable contract in VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 559569 (1930).
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contract has a vested interest therein in the insurance sense, it may be
questioned whether technical insurance doctrines should have any place
in the taxation cases. The court in the case of Chase National Bank v.
United States 99 had little regard for such insurance rules. Under the
view of the Court of Claims in Bailey v. United States,1° 0 the place
of technical insurance doctrines under section 302 (g) is much diminished. The analogy to be drawn from the insurance cases is weakened
by the very fact that annuity transactions for the purposes of exemption
and other questions should not be treated per seas insurance policies.101
Furthermore, in most types of annuities not considered insurance for
tax purposes it appears at least doubtful whether the beneficiary has a
vested interest in the sense that he has such an interest in an ordinary
life insurance policy.102
99
278 U. S. 327 at 334, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929), where it was stated, "It is
true, as emphasized by plaintiffs, that the interest of the beneficiaries in the insurance
policies effected by decedent 'vested' in them before his death and that the proceeds of
the policies came to the beneficiaries not directly from the decedent but from the
insurer. But until the moment of death the decedent retained a legal interest in the
policies which gave him the power of disposition of them and their proceeds as completely as if he were himself the beneficiary of them."
The interest of the beneficiary in the policy during the lifetime of the insured
is very slight if the power to change the beneficiary is reserved. VANCE, INSURANCE,
2d ed., 563 (1930).
100
{Ct. CI. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778, modifying {Ct. CI. 1939) 30 F. Supp.
184, which modified the original opinion, {Ct. CI. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617. See also
Broderick v. Keefe, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 293, reversing Keefe v. Broderick, (D. C.R. I. 1939) 25 F. Supp. 957; and Chase National Bank of New York v.
United States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 625, reversing (D. C. N. Y. 1939)
28 F. Supp. 947.
101 See section 3, supra, p. 860.
102
For tax purposes it appears the interest of the beneficiary in annuity contracts
that are revocable would be similar to that of a beneficiary of an insurance policy.
However, in Schultz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 38 B. T. A. 59 at 63
(1938), the Board of Tax Appeals said, "In the supplemental brief filed for the
petitioners, it was contended that the contracts here are controlled by decisions in insurance cases wherein it has been held that in the absence of the reservation of a right
to change the beneficiary, the insured, or owner, may not surrender the insurance
contract for cash or obtain loans thereon without the consent of the beneficiary, or
beneficiaries, even though the contract contains provision for loans and the surrender
of the policy for cash. . • .
"The contracts herein, with the exception that they contain no reservation of
the right to change the beneficiaries, are the same in all essential respects as the contract
considered by us in Old Colony Trust Co. et al., Executors, 37 B. T. A. 435, and we
there held that the contract under consideration was not a life insurance contract but
an annuity contract. • • . It does not follow therefore that the decisions relied upon
by the petitioners in respect of insurance policies are applicable to the contracts before
us and that annuity contracts which contain loan and cash surrender privileges are
not revocable within the meaning of section 302(d), supra, even though the right to
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Disregarding the types of arguments examined above, the courts
have declared that contracts in which the purchaser or the annuitant
retains the power to change the beneficiary and the right to surrender
the contract for a cash value are to be included within the general
clauses of the respective statutes considered.103 Under whatever conditions a transfer is taxable in which the transferor retains the right
to change the transferee or remainderman, the transfer here is clearly
taxable.104 The situation seems similar to a revocable trust, or one in
which the settlor reserves the right to change the beneficiary. It can
also be compared to the taxation of an insurance policy where the
right to change the beneficiary has been reserved or the purchaser can
cancel the policy and receive the surrender value.
Contentions pertinent to irrevocable contracts are not relevant here.
The nature of the contract and the payments is relatively immaterial
as long as death benefits are given to the beneficiary only provisionally,
and any of his rights can be wiped out by the action of the purchaser
or annuitant under the particular contract. It seems obvious that there
is only an incomplete gift.
change the beneficiary is not_ reserved. Since these contracts may not be classified as
insurance contracts, the answer to the question of revocability is to be found in the
terms of the contracts themselves .•.•"
Since endowment insurance policies are life insurance policies, the decisions holding that the beneficiary has the same interest therein as in ordinary insurance policies are
not directly in point. See VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 547-548 (1930).
103 Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 646, reversing (C. C. A. 2d,
1940) 110 F. (2d) 734; Keller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U.S. 1941)
61 S. Ct. 651, affirming (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 833; Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 16 B. T. A. 314 (1929), reversed by stipulation of counsel, no opinion, (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Chemical Bank & Trust Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 37 B. T. A. 535 (1938); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 1st, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 380,
affirming 37 B. T. A. 435 (1938); State ex rel. Thornton v. Probate Court, 186 Minn.
351, 243 N. W. 389 (1932); Matter of Sothern's Estate, 170 Misc. 805, 14 N. Y. S.
(2d) 509 (1938), affirmed 257 App. Div. 574, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 1 (1939); Kernochan v. United States, (Ct. CI. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 860, cert. den. 309 U. S. 675,
60 S. Ct. ]II (1940); Estate of Wilson, 42 B. T. A., No. 180 (1940); Helvering
v. Tyler, (C. C. A.8th,1940) I II F. (2d) 422, affirmed per stipulation of counsel to
abide by the Supreme Court decisions in the Le Gierse and Keller cases.
104
Section 8 II ( c) of the Internal Revenue Code appears to be the most pertinent
section, and was relied upon in the federal cases cited in note 103, supra. Section 8 II ( d)
also seems applicable. 53 Stat. L. 121-122 (1939), 26 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 8II.
See 38 M1cH. L. REv. 526 (1940).
Under state statutes with no special clauses covering revocable trusts except the
general clause concerning transfers to take effect at or after death, the annuity transactions here would seem to be covered to the same extent by the general language as
revocable transfers of other kinds.
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In fact if the purchaser retains both surrender rights and the power
to change the beneficiary, it might even be contended that the assets
paid by the insurance company can be considered part of his estate
and taxable under the clauses that tax the passing of property at death
to the extent of the interest of the decedent therein.105 In Kernochan v.
United States,1° 8 discussed in the first division of this article, the Court
of Claims had before it an arrangement similar to a deferred annuity
with a provision for payments to a beneficiary upon the death of the
annuitant during the deferred period (plus a cash surrender value that
could only be secured under certain rigorous conditions). It was said,
"The Retirement System was under liability to decedent to
return to him or his estate or nominee the amount deducted from
his salary upon his withdrawal or upon his death prior to retirement. This was an asset of decedent's estate at the time of his
death. It passed to his widow by virtue of the direction contained
in decedent's application. This amount the decedent would have
been entitled to receive during his lifetime upon withdrawal prior
to retirement. His widow was entitled to it only upon his death.
It was therefore properly included in decedent's gross estate." 101
The same results should be reached in the case of annuity with
death benefit contracts and insurance contracts issued only with annuity
contracts, when the surrender right or the right to change the beneficiary of the death benefit has been retained.1° 8 In both cases no matter
what the nature of the payments to the annuitant and the death benefit,
so long as it is not insurance, the situation ought to be within the statute
105
Sec. 8 I I of the Internal Revenue Code reads, "The value of the gross estate
of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death
of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real
property situated outside the United States-(a) To the extent of the interest therein
of the decedent at the time of his death ..•." 53 Stat. L. 120 (1939), 26 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 811.
106
(Ct. Cl. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 860, cert. den., 309 U. S. 675, 60 S. Ct. 71 I
(1940), discussed supra at note 45.
107
Id. at 866. See Estate of Wilson, 42 B. T. A., No. 1So ( 1940).
108
Helvering v. Le Gierse, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 646, reversing (C. C. A. 2d,
1940) 110 F. (2d) 734; Keller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U. S. 1941)
61 S. Ct. 651, affirming (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 833; Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 1st, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 380,
affirming 37 B. T. A. 435 (1938); Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 37 B. T. A. 535 (1938); Helvering v. Tyler, (C. C. A. 8th, 1940)
I I I F. (2d) 422.
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because death cuts off the definite and substantial control of the purchaser or annuitant. 109
Whether the policy is an owner form, or is purchased by an annuitant himself, if the purchaser retains the above rights and the death
benefits are payable to a third party, it seems apparent that the above
results should follow.
2.

Irrevocable Contracts in Which Purchaser Receives
Annuity for His Life

In refund annuity contracts, survivorship or longer life annuities,
annuity with death benefit contracts, and insurance policies obtainable
only with annuity contracts, the purchaser of the contract may retain
the annuity for his life, while the death benefits are to be paid to a
named beneficiary upon his death. When these contracts are irrevocable, in the respect that no right to change the beneficiaries or to
surrender the contract or any other substantial control over the contract
has been reserved, an analogy to transfers of property in which the
transferor keeps a life interest or a life income seems plausible.
Section 811 ( c) was held inapplicable, however, by the Board of
Tax Appeals in Clise v. Commissioner. 110 In that case the decedent
had taken·· out a single premium survivorship or longer life annuity
under which she was to receive an annuity for her life and upon her
death the annuity was to continue to her son for his life. After her
death the commissioner included the value of the annuity payments to
be made to the son in the gross estate as property having been transferred to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after death.
Even though the contract was issued after the adoption of the Joint
Resolution of March 3, 1931, authorizing the taxation of transfers of
property in which the decedent has retained a life income, the board
held that there was no taxable transfer at death. The decision of the
board suggested there was no "transfer'' of "property" under the
statute, but that the purchaser merely received a promise for periodical
109 Other powers of control in addition to the powers to change the beneficiary
and take a surrender value may be reserved. Thus certain powers over distribution of
the proceeds may be kept which will bring the transaction within the general clauses.
However, the usual elections are set and differ only in plan of payment of the principal
sum of the death benefits, so that this power is relatively unimportant.
The observations in this section would likewise apply to revocable assignments of
annuity contracts.
110
41 B. T. A. 820 (1940) (appeal pending).

1941

J

TAXATION OF ANNUITY CONTRACTS

payments which were not to be regarded as income. Mwy v. Heiner 111
was said to govern the case.
The above position results partly from the wording of the statutory
language, which, as in most jurisdictions, provides that the tax is levied
on transfers or property, or any interest therein, intended to take effect
in possession and enjoyment at or after death. One of the leading cases
is In re Honeyman's Estate,112 decided in New Jersey, in which the
court held that unless the grantor retains some interest in the thing
itself transferred, there can be no transfer within the statute. In that
case the transferor had obtained an annuity agreement from the transferee, the annuity to be independent of the property granted. The
transfer of the property betwen the grantor and the grantee, having
no necessary relation to the periodical payments, was held complete.
No interest had been reserved in the very property transferred. The
transferee under the transaction had complete control of the property
and its income, and no strings on it were kept by the grantor.118
111
281 U.S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1930). In Schultz v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 38 B. T. A. 59 (1938), the board held that irrevocable contracts entered
into before l 93 l were not within section 8 II (c). The same result was reached in
connection with two of the contracts involved in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 37 B. T. A. 535 (1938).
112
98 N. J. Eq. 638, 129 A. 393 (1925), affirmed sub. nom. Bugbee v. Board of
Home Missions, 4 N. J. Misc. 99, 131 A. 924 (1926), affirmed, 103 N. J. L. 173,
134 A. 915 (1926).
118
"Judged by this standard, then, where a transfer is made, immediate as to
title and possession, it is not taxable unless there is some condition, reservation or provision by which some interest in, or identifiably tied up with, the very thing transferred, is reserved from the donee until the donor's death." In re Honeyman's Estate,
98 N. J. Eq. 638 at 643, 129 A. 393 (1925). The following cases are in accord with
the Honeyman case: In re Edgerton's Estate, 35 App. Div. 125, 54 N. Y. S. 700
(1898), affirmed 1$8 N. Y. 671, 52 N. E. u24 (1899); In re Thorne's Estate,
44 App. Div. 8, 60 N. Y. S. 419 (1899); People v. United Christian Missionary
Society, 341 Ill. 251, 173 N. E. 132 (1930); In re Hamilton's Estate, 217 Wis. 491,
259 N. W. 433 (1935); In re Seaich's Estate, 136 Misc. 201, 240 N. Y. S. 524
(1930); Krause's Estate, 325 Pa. 479, 191 A. 162 (1937); In re Galpin, 162 Misc.
277, 295 N. Y. S. 192 (1937); In re Kellogg, 123 N. J. Eq. 322, 197 A. 263
(1938); In re Case, 191 Wash. 6, 70 P. (2d) 806 (1937); Fidelity Union Trust Co.
v. Martin, II8 N. J. L. 277, 192 A. 74 (1937), affirmed u9 N. J. L. 425, 197 A.
40 (1938), II9 N. J. L. 426, 197 A. 41 (1938); In re Molke's Estate, 198 Wash. 6,
86 P. (2d) 763 (1939); Hirsh v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 982;
Lincoln v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 198 (1928); Security Trust & Savings Bank v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 11 B. T. A. 833 ( 1928); Johnson v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, IO B. T. A. 41 I ( 1928). But see Tips v. Bass, (D. C. Tex. 1927)
21 F. (2d) 460; Conwell's Estate, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 368 (1888); Todd's Estate (No. 2),
237 Pa. 466, 85 A. 845 (1912). The Pennsylvania cases are criticized by dicta in
Barber's Estate, 304 Pa. 235, 155 A. 565 (1931), and overruled by In re Krause's
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This reasoning was evidently meant to be applied by the board to
the commercial annuity situation in the Clise case. As the board pointed
out, the annuitant transfers property (money) to the insurance company completely and irrevocably, receiving in return a contract right
for periodical payments and for an annuity to be paid to another upon
his death under specified circumstances. No interest whatsoever in a
legal sense is kept in the actual money transferred to the insurance
company. It ·becomes the property of the company to manage and use
as the company sees fit and has no relation, that can be traced, to the
annuity paid to the purchaser. If the form of the transactions is made
vital in the Honeyman type of case, it might be said to be vital here.
Citing cases concerning testamentary trusts, the board said further
that the payments to the purchaser could not be considered income since
they are certain in any event. The intention, evidently, was to point out
that payments under an annuity contract can be conceived as payments
of capital or capital and income. Considering their source, it might be
further pointed out that the payments, if the annuitant lives very long,
are made from funds derived through collections from other annuitants
who have died early.
Despite the above lines of reasoning, the result in the Clise case
seems very doubtful in: regard to all of the types of annuity contracts
or combination contracts previously mentioned. The Honeyman case
and like cases which would tend to support it can in themselves be
severely criticized, but even if they are accepted it does not seem that
the result in the Clise case follows. It is fairly easy to distinguish the
Honeyman case type of situation from the commercial annuity case
herein considered. In the former type of cases ( with some exceptions)
merely a transfer between the grantor and grantee of the property
transferred is at issue, whereas in the commercial annuity situation the
transfer sought to be taxed is between the transferor of the property
and a donee to be paid by the transferee of the property ( the insurance
company). The obvious difference is that in the Honeyman case situation the transferee and donee acquires legal possession and actual enEstate, supra. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, l 6
B. T. A. 438 (1929) (agreement to pay 6% interest); Doerschuck v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 17 B. T. A. II23 (1929) (agreement to pay specified amount "as
salary''); Polk v. Miles, (D. C. Md. 1920) 268 F. 175. The federal cases were all
decided before the amendment of the federal statute in 1931, however. Many other
somewhat similar cases with arrangements in addition to the bare promise to pay an
annuity are to be found. See Cohen, "Annuities and Transfer Taxes," 7 KAN. B. A. J.
139 (1938).
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joyment at once of the property transferred, and the transferor receives only a contract right independent of such property. On the other
hand, in the commercial annuity case the donee does not gain complete
possession or enjoyment of the property transferred ( whether that be
considered the money transferred or a contract right given to him)
until the death of the purchaser of the contract. The reasoning of the
Honeyman case and related cases is formal and technical, but becomes
more artificial when aplied to commercial annuity cases.
Hardly defensible is the citation of cases holding that payments
certain in connection with testamentary trusts are not to be regarded as
payments of income but as legacies or bequests under the applicable
income tax sections.114 Those cases were concerned with the taxation of
trust income to the beneficiary and the interpretation of section 22 (b)
(3) of the income tax relating to the taxation of the receipt of gifts
and property received at death. But annuity payments under commercial contracts should be considered income in their entirety under the
Sixteenth Amendment.115 The payments, if conceived as partly payments of capital and income and not entirely payments of income,
would still be included within section 8 I I ( c). If it is said that the
annuitant is in reality receiving a return of capital and income, as has
been argued in relation to the income tax,116 certainly the retention, in
effect, of an interest in the capital amount as well as in the income would
be a greater retention of interest in the property transferred than if
merely income were reserved. If what is given to the donee in a commercial annuity contract is conceived to be a contract right, that right
is postponed until death and all beneficial aspects of the one contract
are in favor of the annuitant until his death. Factual differences exist
to reinforce the above arguments. In the private annuity there is no
114
The board stated in relation to this point, "The property (money) which
she was 'transferring' was irretrievably gone and for it she was getting a promise of an
annuity, payment 9f which was not limited or related to income from the consideration which she paid, but was to be made at all events. It may not be regarded as income." Clise v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 41 B. T. A. 820 at 825 (1940),
citing Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365, 54 S. Ct. 221 (1933); Helvering
v. Pardee, 290 U. S. 365, 54 S. Ct. 221 (1933); Ronald De Reuter, 7 B. T. A.
600 at 607 (1927), affd., Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148, 51 S. Ct. 374
(1931).
115
Sol. Op. 160, III-2 CuM. BuLL. 60 (1924); MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME
370-374 (1937).
116
II TEMPLE L. Q. 567 (1937); Tyler and Ohl, "The Revenue Act of 1934,"
83 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 607 at 633 (1935). See Raymond v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) l 14 F. (2d) 140, cert. den., (U. S. 1940) 61 S. Ct.
319.
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relation between the property transferred and the annuity received in
return. There is an important relation in the case of an annuity issued
by an insurance company. The contracts will only be issued at specified
rates actuarially determined by reference to mortality tables, discount
rates, and the amount of annuity payment desired. A definite reserve
is set up for each contract, and it has a definite relation to the amount
paid in as consideration.
The argument that the change in the law after the case of May v.
Heiner 117 concerned only trusts is contradicted by the language used
in the statute and has already been touched upon.118 When the above
elements are considered, it would seem that the general conclusion is
inescapable that in commercial annuity contract cases there is in reality
a transfer to a donee postponed until death, the benefit and entire use
value of such transfer being kept by the purchaser of the contract until
his death. Technical and narrow definitions of transfer should be
avoided. The result for tax purposes is exactly the same as if a contract
were entered into by which the transferee of money promised to pay
the transferor amounts equal to the interest plus portions of the principal and upon his death to continue the payments to a third party until
the interest and principal amount paid in were exhausted. In the annuity
cases there may be an additional element that the payments continue
for both lives, adding an insurance or risk element. For the purposes of
taxation that element would seem here to be immaterial. If the transfer is considered to be one of money, all the rights in relation to such
amount are kept by the purchaser for his life and pass by his agreement
to a donee at his death. If the transfer is considered ·to be of rights in
a contract, the beneficial enjoyment of such ·contract is kept by the
purchaser for his life and only upon his death does the donee receive
any rights.
Several cases, as already pointed out, have considered the annuity
transactions as taxable under the general clauses if a right of some kind
was kept by the annuitant giving him control over the contract and in
117

281 U.S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1930).
Page 892, supra. The Senate committee report on the Revenue Bill in 1932
in regard to section 302(c) said, "The purpose of this amendment to section 302(c)
of the Revenue Act of I 926 is to clarify in certain respects the amendments made to
that section by the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, which were adopted to render
taxable a transfer under which the decedent reserved the income for his life. The Joint
Resolution was designed to avoid the effect of decisions of the Supreme Court holding
such a transfer not taxable if irrevocable and not made in contemplation of death.•.•"
S. REP. 665, 72d Cong., 1st sess. (1932), quoted in 1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 2),
P· 53 2 •
118
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effect over the amount transferred to the insurance company.119 Under
section 8 r I ( c) it seems these transactions involve a transfer by trust
or otherwise. The only distinction between these cases and the Clise
case pertinent in the present inquiry would seem to be the type of
interest retained. Here it might be said that, rather than control, the
income plus portions of the capital has been retained. 120
In relation to refund annuities the point is even stronger. The
payments to the donee are definitely limited to the sum equal to the
total of premiums paid. The purchaser keeps the interest and portions
of the capital, if not all, and in any event it is provided that only the
amount paid in will be paid to the donee. That also is true of annuity
with death benefit and combination contracts. The amount received at
death is no greater than what was paid in, and even if the sums received by the annuitant or purchaser are not strictly regarded as interest, they correspond to income from the contract and from the
amount paid in, and are calculated and paid according to set schedules.
Provision for beneficiaries at the death of the annuitant is thus made
from property owned at the time the contract is taken out.
Not only is the Clise case then to be criticized on more or less
technical grounds, but certainly the result cannot be justified on policy
considerations manifested in other cases concerning annuities. Although
most of the cases have been decided in relation to contracts that have
been revocable, it has been reiterated that the real nature of the contract must be examined. For tax purposes tax results should be highly
important. The types of annuity transactions herein considered might
become very fertile instruments for tax avoidance purposes if the Clise
case is ultimately adopted by the higher courts and the state courts.
By use of these contracts the purchaser could provide for those whom
he wishes in a very substantial and sure way, and yet retain a substantial means of support for himself during his lifetime. Disregardip.g
other possible disadvantages of annuity contract schemes in comparison
to the setting up of trusts, the same purposes can be accomplished as
would be accomplished by transfers in trust and other transfers in which
a life income is retained. Any analogy to a trust situation or a transfer
119

Note 103, supra.
If the purchase of an annuity is considered to be the purchase of income, the
capital having been converted into income as suggested in materials in note 116, supra,
in relation to the income tax, then the proposition developed in this section is still
tenable. The contract rights for the income are kept by the purchaser for his life and
inure only to the beneficiary upon his death. The death benefit payment or payments
are similar in character to those which the purchaser received.
120
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of property with the retention of a life estate is incomplete technically.
But that technical difference can be minimized for tax purposes.
If the primary purpose of annuity contracts is assumed to be the
protection and assurance of income in old age, a tax on the provisions
concerning payments to beneficiaries will not directly impair the primary function. Should special treatment or exemption from taxation
be desirable, that should be accomplished by legislative enactment
rather than by technical and narrow judicial interpretation of the statute
which might easily lead to wholesale avoidance of inheritance and
estate taxation. "Transfer" for the purposes of the estate and inheritance taxes obviously means something more than in other law fields 121
and on the basis of what has been said here it is submitted that it should
include the transfers effected through commercial annuity transactions
in which the entire benefit of the contract is retained by the purchaser
for life.

3. Irrevocable Contracts In Which the Purchaser
Retains an Interest
Another interesting justification for taxation should not be overlooked. In the case of refund annuity contracts, deferred annuity contracts with death benefits during the deferred period, and survivor
or longer life annuities, the beneficiary receives payment only in case
the annuitant does not survive a definite period of time or in case the
annuitant does not survive the benficiary. This feature, which is inherent in the above types of contracts as presently written, furnishes the
basis for a strong contention that the purchaser or annuitant retains
a sufficient interest in the contract to classify the transfer as one to take
effect at or after death.
To consider the refund contract beneficiary's interest as complete
would be erroneous. The beneficiary under these contracts will receive
payments only upon the death of the primary annuitant within a certain period of time. In the usual forms the insurance company promises
to pay an annuity for life to the annuitant in unconditional terms. If
the annuitant dies before he has received a guaranteed sum, the unpaid
amounts to that sum will be paid to the beneficiary. The beneficiary has
a vested interest subject to defeasance. 122 The same sort of interest is
121

See Merry, "Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Concept of a Transfer," 38 M1cH.

L. REV. 1032 (1940).
122

"When the interest of the beneficiary is fixed by the terms of the contract
but subject to be defeated by the happening of some event beyond the lawful control
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held by the beneficiary under a deferred annuity with death benefit
features, and under a survivorship or longer life annuity. In the latter
case the interest is subject to defeasance upon the predecease of the
beneficiary.
While attempts have been made to tax the benefits payable at
death when this type of interest is present, they have never been successful in any published case. The theory for inclusion in the gross
estate is based upon the cases concerning contingent and vested interests
in other types of property. In the case of Klein v. United Statesm
it was held that a transfer in which the transferee received only a contingent remainder was within the statute taxing transfers taking e:ffect
at or after death. The transfer there was to A for life, remainder to
the grantor, but if the grantor predeceased A, then the remainder was
to go to A. This case was followed, however, by Helvering v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co.,124 saying that if the grantee received a vested remainder subject to divestment the property was not to be included in the gross
estate of the grantor. This latter case was then followed in the Supreme
Court by two cases m in which the government contended that insurance policy proceeds should be included in the net estate of the decedent ( the insured) when the beneficiaries' interests were vested but
subject to be defeated by their predecease. The contention was rejected.
Thus a contingent interest in annuity cases in the federal courts was an
insufficient interest to include the property in the estate of the purchaser.
The case of H elvering v. Hallock 126 again seems to change the
picture. In this case A transferred property in trust to B for life, to be
redelivered to A if A was living at the death of B, otherwise to go to C
of the insured, as her death before maturity of the policy, such interest is regarded aa
vested, but liable to be divested." VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 575 (1930). In re
Dreuil & Co., (D. C. La. 1915) 221 F. 796, and Cox v. Cox, 192 Ill. App. 286
(1913), are cited as supporting this rule in the case of beneficiaries under endowment
or tontine policies.
The possibility must not be overlooked, however, in the case of refund beneficiaries of establishing the proposition that the beneficiary has only a contingent interest
and not a vested interest. The promise is to pay to the annuitant for his life, and since
he may live past the guaranteed period, it could be said that the promise is to pay
the guaranteed sum to him if he lives. Then the interest of the beneficiary would be
contingent.
123
283 U.S. 231, 51 S. Ct. 398 (1931).
124
296 U. S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74 (1935); and also Becker v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78 (1935).
125
Bingham v. United States, 296 U.S. 2II, 56 S. Ct. 180 (1935); Industrial
Trust Co. v. United States, 296 U. S. 220, 56 S. Ct. 182 (1935).
126
309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
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and D. The majority of the Supreme Court repudiated the distinction
made in the St. Louis Union Trust Company case. Since this case was
relied upon in the insurance cases, they are hardly authority at present
for the proposition that was made in regard to predeceasing clauses in
insurance policies. The decision in the Hallock case appears to be pertinent authority for the inclusion of the death benefits in the gross
estate of the purchaser under the annuity contracts mentioned. It has
already been so applied in the case of an insurance policy with predeceasing clauses.121
In refund and deferred annuity contracts the grantee's interest, as
in the Hallock case, is conditional upon the death of the grantor (purchaser). In that case the interest was conditional upon the death of the
grantor before the death of the beneficiary of the trust, but in these
annuities it is conditional on the death of the grantor within a certain
period of time. Until such death of the purchaser it is uncertain whether
the beneficiary will receive anything at all under the contract. This
conditional character of the beneficiary's interest appears to make the
contracts as close to testamentary transactions within the general clauses
as transfers of ordinary property with the reservation of a vested interest in the grantee subject to divestment. In fact, in these contracts it
might be said that the annuitant reserves the entire interest in the
contracts for the guarantee period, and the beneficiary has an interest
only if the annuitant dies within that time. Therefore the interest of
the beneficiary is not vested but contingent.128 In any event, however,
the interest reserved here is fully as great as that reserved by the
grantor in the Ha/lock case.
Survivorship or longer life annuities can also be said to be similar
to transfers of property in which the beneficiary has a vested interest
subject to being divested. The interest, of the beneficiary here, too,
may be "vested" under insurance law-yet it is conditional upon the
predecease of the purchaser or the annuitant.
Whenever the contracts contain provisions that if the beneficiary
should die before the purchaser, the death benefits should go to the
estate of the purchaser, the above cases would likewise apply. This
result seems indicated in connection with insurance policies, at least
127
Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778, modifying (Ct.
Cl. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 184, which modified the original opinion, (Ct. Cl. 1939)
27 F. Supp. 617; and Chase National Bank v. United States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) u6
F. (2d) 625, reversing (D. C. N. Y. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 947.
128
See note 122, supra.
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under some circumstances, but even if rejected in connection with insurance, appears justifiable in connection with annuity contracts not considered insurance. The problem here is whether there was a transfer
under the statute, and a sufficient interest retained by the transferor to
justify taxation under the general clauses. A comparison and analogy
should be made to the cases under the general clauses. The question in
the case of insurance policies involves insurance policy doctrines in connection with the insurance section. Furthermore, these annuity transactions are closer in effect to transfers in trust or otherwise because they
involve no creation of benefits upon death.
In states in which the rule of the Hallock case is in force, the same
results should follow. 129 Where the opposite rule has been adopted,
refund and deferred annuities might still be in the gross estate. 180
In spite of the above analogy to the Hallock case situation, it
seems apparent that certain difficulties must be surmounted. Two recent
cases before the Board of Tax Appeals are pertinent authority for a
contrary holding. The Clise case 181 is directly in point on its facts, but
is not forceful authority because this issue was not discussed in the decision. In the case of the Estate of Thompson, 182 however, the Board
of Tax Appeals had before it irrevocable endowment insurance policies
taken out by the decedent before 1918. Upon his death in 1935, the
government contended that the proceeds of the policies paid to his wife
should be included in the gross estate because the wife had only a contingent interest in them or at least an interest dependent on her survival
of the decedent. If he had lived until the maturity dates, the wife
would have received nothing and the face amount would have been paid
to the insured. In rejecting this branch of the argument, the board
129
Brill v. Holman, 160 Ore. II8, 84 P. (2d) 105 (1938). See also Hackett v.
Bankers Trust Co., 122 Conn. 107, 187 A. 653 (1936); Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 267 Mass. 240, 166 N. E. 729 (1929); Du Bois' Appeal,
121 Pa. St. 368, 15 A. 641 (1888); In re Schermerhorn's Estate, (Surr. Ct. N. Y. Co.
1913) 149 N. Y. S. 95; In re Dunlap's Estate, 205 App. Div. 128, 199 N. Y. S. 147
(1923), affirming II5 Misc. 580, 188 N. Y. S. 762 (1921). Other New York decisions are apparently contrary: In re Bowers' Estate, 195 App. Div. 548, 186 N. Y. S.
912 (1921), affirmed, 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E. 910 (1921); In re Wing's Estate,
(Surr. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1921) 190 N. Y. S. 908; In re Kirby's Estate, 133 Misc. 152,
231 N. Y. S. 408 (1929); In re Schweinert's Estate, 133 Misc.- 762, 234 N. Y. S.
307 (1929); In re Barstow's Estate, 230 App. Div. 371, 244 N. Y. S. 588 (1930),
affirmed, 256 N. Y. 647, 177 N. E. 177 (1931). See also In re Molke's Estate, 198
Wash. 6, 86 P. (2d) 763 (1939).
180
See note 1 22, supra.
181
41 B. T. A. 820 (1940) (appeal pending), discussed supra at note II0.
182
41 B. T. A. 901 (1940) (appeal dismissed, C. C. A. 1st, Nov. 26, 1940).
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stated that the beneficiary under insurance law had a vested interest
and divided the contract into endowment and insurance features, stating the wife was the sole beneficiary of the insurance feature. It was
concluded further that the rights were fixed on the making of the contract and no incidents of ownership were retained to justify retroactive
application of section 302(g). The dissent stated the proceeds should
be included in the gross estate under section 302(h) and the Hallock
case.
Disregarding the issue concerning the retroactive application of
section 302(g), since annuity death benefit proceeds are not to be governed by that section, it seems the arguments of the board in respect
to the interest retained by the insured are not sound and should not be
applied to the annuity cases.
The statement of the board that the interest of the beneficiary of
an endowment insurance policy is vested is correct. The interest of a
beneficiary under an annuity contract would also probably be vested.
But "vested interest" in the sense used in insurance law is a term
describing the various rights of the beneficiary. He cannot be divested
of his position as beneficiary without his consent, he may pay the
premiums if the insured ceases payment, he may object to surrender
without his consent, etc.188 It still remains true, however, in endowment
insurance cases ( and in the annuity contracts under consideration), that
the beneficiary will receive no proceeds if the insured lives for a definite
period of time. The interest of the beneficiary is vested in a property
sense, but in this sense it is subject to being divested 18"' and the analogy
to the Hallock case holds good.
Furthermore, the separation of the endowment insurance contract
into endowment and insurance features seems artificial and is not
pertinent. The analogy to annuity contracts would be to divide them
into annuity and insurance features, a suggestion already examined in
relation to the problem considered in the first section. On this point
the board said,
"While it is true that the decedent would have been entitled to
receive the face amount of each policy had he lived until it matured, that circumstance does not lead to the conclusion that the
proceeds of the policy received by the wife are to be included in
the gross estate under section 302 (g). Endowment policies of
insurance like these may be divided into two parts-first, a contract
138
1

H

VANCE, lNsuRANCE, 2d ed., 541-551 (1930).
Note 122, supra.
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of endowment and, second, a contract of insurance.185 • • • The
decedent alone had a chance of benefiting from the endowment
feature of the policy. He would have received that benefit had he
lived until it matured, but his death put an end to the possibility.
The right to the endowment did not pass to anyone else at his
death and thus his interest in the policy was obliterated by his
death. . •. He was not a beneficiary of the insurance feature of the
contract. His wife was beneficiary there. Although his death made
it certain she would receive the insurance proceeds, nevertheless
her rights were fixed by the contract and nothing passed from him
to her at his death." 186
In relation to endowment insurance contracts, the division suggested by the board is merely used for mathematical actuarial purposes. Professor Huebner himself states that a better picture of endowment insurance is to consider the contract as a savings contract plus
decreasing insurance.137 Under this view the payment to the beneficiary
consists partially of amounts contributed by the insured and partially
of a death protection element. But any division of this type of contract
into its "parts" for the purpose of taxation under the inheritance and
estate taxes disregards the realities of the situation. For the purposes at
hand the plain fact is that the contract has been made and issued as one
whole contract. Upon the death of the insured within a certain period
of time the beneficiary receives a certain sum. The insured receives
that sum if he does not die within the period. No matter what division
is made actuarially, the interest of the beneficiary depends on the decease of the insured under certain conditions. It is this fact that makes
an occasion for taxation. And it has no apparent relation to actuarial
computations or the mathematics of insurance.
This separation of contracts to block application of the Hallock
case is still more indefensible as applied to annuity contracts. While
in a refund contract and a deferred annuity, the refund features can
be looked upon as separable and consisting of decreasing and increasing
term insurance respectively, the payments will be made to the beneficiary only upon a certain condition depending upon the length of life
of the annuitant. The payments will be made to the annuitant if he
lives, to the beneficiary if he does not. And in either case, the contract
remains one for the disbursement of an estate. The same can be said of
a survivorship or longer life annuity. The separation of the contract
135

Citing HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE, 3d ed., 102 (1935).
Estate of Thompson, 41 B. T. A. 901 at 909 (1940).
131
HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE, 3d ed., 103-104, 1.p-144 (1935).
136
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for the other tax purposes has already been condemned, and in view
of the fact that the parties made the contract one unit it should be so
considered for tax purposes. Certainly the purchaser has no concern
with the mechanics of the company.
Objections that there is no "transfer" have already been considered
and would seem to be no more pertinent than in the case where the
right to revoke the contract is retained.
The Hallock case left open the question of retroactivity, which is
not yet settled. Since this question is not peculiar to annuity contracts,
it will not be discussed here.
Joint and survivor contracts merit separate treatment. The above
discussion is applicable but a further ground for taxation may exist
under the clauses taxing joint tenancies. The only case concerning this
type of annuity contract is In re J-Vilson's Estate. 188 The taxing authorities contended that the transfer was taxable under the section of the
statute taxing transfers by joint tenancies. In rejecting this argument
the court rested its decision primarily upon the ground (previously
examined) that the contract was governed by the rule that insurance
proceeds payable to a named beneficiary were not taxable in New York
at that time. Some reliance was placed upon the argument of counsel
that the transfer was not taxable because it was complete and irrevocable
at the time the contract was made with the insurance company. The
point was made by counsel that in a joint tenancy a joint tenant could
transfer his property and destroy the right of survivorship. But in
these contracts that could not be done without the agreement of the
survivor to assign his rights. 189
The statute in force at death and when the annuity contracts were
taken out included property held jointly or by a tenancy by the entirety
or when deposited in banks in the joint names of two or more persons
and payable to either or the survivor.140 Under this statute, at least in
so far as property acquired jointly after the enactment of the above
188

143 Misc. 742, 257 N. Y. S. 230 (1931).
The contract would govern, and where the contract provides for joint benefits
and that the obligation should survive, the obligees cannot be deprived of this advantage
except by their consent. WILLIAMS, PERSONAL PROPERTY, 18th ed., 526 (1926).
However, if the annuitants were considered joint tenants, that would not be the case.
Since they have only rights upon a contract, it ~ould appear that the first rule applies.
140
"Whenever property is held in the joint names of two or more persons, or as
tenants by the entirety, or is deposited in banks or other institutions or depositaries in
the joint names of two or more persons and payable to either or the survivor, upon
the death of one of such persons the right of the surviving tenant by the entirety,
joint tenant or joint tenants, person or persons, to the immediate ownership or pas139
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clause is concerned, tenancies by the entirety, joint tenancies and joint
accounts were held constitutionally taxable.141
The only distinguishing point in respect to joint and survivor contracts would appear to be the interposition of the insurance company.
Apparently the interest of the tenants is no more "vested" in these
contracts than in tenancies by the entirety. In these tenancies likewise
the survivor cannot be deprived of his right of survivorship without his
consent.142 The rights of the annuitants in these contracts depend upon
the contract, but since survivorship is the occasion for taxation and since
the character of the interest of the survivor changes upon the death of
one of the annuitants, there appears to be as much a basis for taxation
as in the case of tenancies by the entirety.143
The technical arguments concerning the wording "property" would
appear to be analogous to such arguments in connection with annuity
contracts in which the purchaser has a life annuity. Either there is an
session and enjoyment of such property, shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the
provisions of this article in the same manner as though (a) in the case of tenancies
by the entirety one-half of the property to which such transfer relates belonged absolutely to the deceased tenant by the entirety and (b) in all other cases in the same
manner as though a fractional part of the property to be determined by dividing the
value of the entire property by the number of joint tenants, joint depositors or persons
belonged absolutely to the deceased joint tenant, joint depositor or person.••." 59
N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1928), § 220(5). The statute has since been changed.
Hl Cases collected in 2 C. C. H. INHERITANCE, EsTATE AND GIFT TAX SERVICE,
6th ed., 7743 (1940).
H 2 The right of the survivor is not defeated by conveyance by either husband
or wife or sale under execution. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 218-219, 235237 (1939).
143
While the restrictions on the joint annuity are not as great as in tenancies by
the entirety, the survivor receives exclusive possession of the entire payments under the
contract, and furthermore the right to receive such amount is made certain by the predecease of the other annuitant or annuitants. For cases concerning tenancies by the entirety, see 69 A. L. R. 766 (1930); Knouff, "Death Taxes on Completed Transfers
Inter Vivos," 36 MICH. L. REv. 1284 at 1295-1298 (1938).
This type of contract therefore presents a somewhat weaker case than tenancies
by the entirety on a constitutional basis. However, since it has been held that the full
value of the entire property of the decedent may be included in the gross estate
when the joint estate was created after the enactment of the joint estate clause, it
would appear that the tax under the federal statute in so far as constitutional issues
are concerned is justified. See Foster v. Commissioner, 303 U. S. 618, 58 S. Ct. 525
(1938), rehearing den., 303 U.S. 667, 58 S. Ct. 748 (1938), affirming (C. C. A.
9th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 486. The same result was reached in regard to joint estates
created before the enactment of the clause. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363,
59 S. Ct. 551 (1939), motion to set aside judgment denied, 306 U.S. 620, 59 S. Ct.
640 (1939).
For cases concerning joint tenancies, see 84 A. L. R. 180 (1933); Knouff,
"Death Taxes on Completed Transfers Inter Vivos," 36 MICH. L. REv. 1284 at
1295-1298 (1938).
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enjoyment by the annuitant of the amount transferred or a creation of
joint rights thereunder, and in either event it appears the statute could
cover the case.144
Therefore, while there is some distinction between the characteristics of the interests under these contracts in comparison to joint tenancies, joint accounts, and tenancies by the entirety, the contracts should
be included within the statutes as property held jointly with a right of
survivorship to the same extent at least as in property held under tenancies by the entirety and property held by joint tenancy under which
the entire estate is taxable when it passes to the survivor.
We have seen that two principal problems arise in connection with
the estate and inheritance taxation of death benefits paid on annuity
contracts issued by life insurance companies. First, considering the particular type of policy at hand, it should be ascertained whether the
policy comes within the clauses or cases relating to insurance pr0ceeds.
The test should be whether there is an "insurance" risk. Protection
against an early death by a pooling of risks is the crucial element, unless
the particular statute should indicate otherwise.
Since most of the contracts commonly called annuity contracts are
not life insurance contracts within such a test and should not be considered such, the second question that often arises is whether the particular policy comes within the general clauses. Attempts have been
made to distinguish commercial annuity transactions from other types
of transfers, but most annuity transactions are analogous to certain
other transfers for estate and inheritance tax purposes. Whatever analysis should be made of the contracts for the purposes of other types- of
tax statutes, in the case of the estate and inheritance taxes, the similarity to other kinds of transactions which are taxable can hardly be
overlooked.
u 4 However, if the statute is to be constructed strictly it might not cover the
situation. Thus the federal statute provides that all property at the death of the decedent should be included in the gross estate "To the extent of the interest therein held
as joint tenants .•• or as tenants by the entirety ••• or deposited, with any person
carrying on the banking business, in their joint names and payable to either or the
survivor••••" Section 8II (e) of the Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. L. 122 (1939).
It could be said that the interests of the annuitants are not as joint tenants,
tenants by the entirety, or in joint deposits with a banker. Here the interests are held
by contract, it would seem, and probably not by a technical joint tenancy.
On the other hand a less technical ,viewpoint could also be taken, and "joint
tenants" be construed to cover the case. Treas. Reg. 80, art. 22 (1937), states, "The
foregoing provisions of the statute extend to joint ownerships wherein the right of
survivorship exists.•.• The statute specifically reaches property held jointly by the
decedent and any other person or persons.•.."

